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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
What makes for a well-lived life? How does one go about making choices that 
enable one to lead such a life? Having thought about and struggled with these questions 
myself, I am delighted to add my voice to the ongoing discussion on how to live an 
authentic life and find oneself in the midst of everydayness. The purpose of this study is 
to develop informed curriculum and leadership agendas to promote the creating and 
living of authentic lives by organization and community members. More specifically, 
this research pertains to the private and public spaces that culture provides those who 
are interested in the moral domain. Three categories direct this inquiry: authenticity, 
narrative identity, and imagination. These categories are derived from the work of 
Martin Heidegger (1962), Paul Ricoeur (1984; 1988; 1992), and Richard Kearney 
(1995; 1988; 2002). One major implication of the research could reside in the 
development of curriculum to help organization and community members reflect on the 
moral domain of their lives. In the introduction to their book, Questioning Ethics, 
Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (1999: 2) bring authors together from many 
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disciplines and cultures to delve into the nature of social life and argue that “no amount 
of neo-Nietzchean aestheticizing can dispense with the need for moral…vigilance.” 
Statement of Research Topic 
As adults, we often become part of the social mass, the anonymous “they.” The 
complex processes of everyday life so completely absorb our attention that we can lose 
contact with our deepest inner selves. We live basically scattered and fragmented lives, 
pushed and pulled this way and that by the changing tides of fad and fashion. Our hectic 
and “involved” way of life effectively shields us from the disclosure of our underlying 
existential anxiety, guilt, and fear of death. Our post-modern culture provides ready-
made ways of interpreting everything.  
By keeping ourselves preoccupied with small talk, chatter, and “everydayness,” 
we lose the uncanniness of existence in a tranquil and familiar world. We are thrown 
into the middle of a fully-formed human culture. We often develop a social personality 
by slightly modifying the “they-self.” We seldom make real choices of our own; rather, 
we are carried along by the expectations of our culture. We can grow into 
fundamentally irresolute people, lost in what “they” say. To be sure, we may be deeply 
involved and busily engaged, but whose life-purposes are we pursuing? Many of us 
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become responsible adults but inauthentic people. In order to notice the lostness, 
fragmentation, and conformity, something must reach us where we are submerged in 
inauthenticity. We too often become interchangeable parts of the huge social 
mechanism; if we become unavailable for our roles, then someone else can easily step 
into our places, perhaps playing “our” parts even better than we did. 
Background of Research Topic 
C. Wright Mills (1959) described the post-modern period as one in which the 
economy would shift employment from heavy industry to non-unionized clerical, 
service, and new industrial sectors. He foresaw the rise of multinational corporations, 
trouble in the social welfare system, and a decline in human freedom and choice.  
In his The Theory of Communicative Action (1984; 1987), Habermas presents a 
general framework that attempts to explain how capitalist modernization produces 
social pathologies. He argues that social well-being depends on a critical balance 
between social processes—which reproduce cultural traditions, social integration, and 
personal identities—and activities related to the economic and productive operations 
necessary for physical survival. In his view, capitalist modernization upsets the balance 
between the first realm—a background context, which he calls the “lifeworld,” in which 
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we construct, maintain and refresh meanings—and the second, which he calls “system.” 
In modernity, directives from the system begin to outweigh those deriving from the 
lifeworld. Concerns such as profitability, productivity, efficiency, practicality, success, 
and economic growth—the various essences of capitalism and industrialization—
gradually displace other interests related to the integrity of the lifeworld—such as play, 
morals, self-expression, and social norms.  
In the post-modern world, our imagination is controlled by the media of money 
and power. Our public spaces are subjected to bureaucratic social administration (as in 
policing, propaganda, social work, and mass education) and social manipulation by the 
marketplace (as in advertising and commercial mass media). Simultaneously, we 
struggle with depression, boredom, and substance abuse in our private spaces. 
Increasing numbers of people in our society have trouble maintaining a sense of 
meaningfulness in what they do and how they live. 
Significance of Study 
It is expected that this dissertation will indicate how people can become more 
authentic when everything in post-modern culture pulls in the opposite direction, 
keeping people un-centered but functional for the social processes. It is believed that 
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this dissertation will help leaders and directors in various settings—schools, 
corporations, and non-profit organizations—to aid others, to question their own work 
and lives, to develop an interconnected sense of being, and to share with others their 
spirit, i.e. the essence of themselves. The development of leadership and ethics 
curriculum in higher education may be the most significant value of this work, because 
we are now seeing more and more questions of authenticity and a need for moral 
vigilance.  
Summary 
People in contemporary society want to make good judgments about how they 
should live, and they want to learn how to lead lives that really matter. More of us want 
to incorporate a deeper meaning into our lives—something that makes a difference in 
this world and satisfies our souls, not just pads our bank accounts or fulfills others’ 
expectations of us—than ever before. This research hopes to help people understand the 
way they think about how to live. The following sections of this dissertation provide a 
context for this study with a review of the literature in Chapter Two and a description of 
the research process, including the theoretical background that will undergird data 
analysis, in Chapter Three. The data will be presented and analyzed in Chapter Four. 
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Findings and implications will follow in Chapter Five.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This review of the literature examines research on the topic of leading and 
identifying authentic lives. The main purpose of this is to provide a context for the 
relationship between hermeneutic theory and the living of an authentic life. The concept 
of authenticity has deep roots in existential philosophy and psychology. Five thinkers 
will be presented here, each with a slightly different approach to the quest for meaning.  
Paul Ricoeur 
Time and imagination together with narratives provide Ricoeur with a strategy 
for describing the possible. That human possibilities are displayed in stories and 
histories means that Ricoeur’s narrative theory stands at the crossroads of philosophical 
anthropology and his textual hermeneutics. Ricoeur is a philosopher of human 
possibility and his literature holds pride of place in this philosophical project, for it is by 
reading stories and histories that we learn what is humanly possible. 
Ricoeur’s (1984: 54) formula is that the understanding of narrative follows “the 
destiny of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a 
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configured time.” To unpack this dense formula, Ricoeur is stating that prefigured time 
is the time of our prior understanding—our understanding prior to engaging with the 
narrative. Refigured time is the new understanding of the real world we have as a result 
of having read the narrative and understood it. The configured time is the emplotment, 
the time of the narrative that orders its events and incidents into a plot. Plot is what 
enables us to understand narrative as narrative, and as mimetic of the real world; it 
enables us to see the actions depicted in a narrative as human actions.  
According to Ricoeur (1984), narrative time has the same threefold composition 
as time experienced by humans, phenomenological time, but that it uses its mirror 
image. In narrative, prefiguring is configured into refiguring, while, in real life, the 
present is an anticipation of the future mediated by the memory of the past. It is because 
narrative time and real time mirror one another that the ”healthy circle” between 
narrative and real life exists: we can understand narrative because we understand life, 
and our understanding of life is bettered by our understanding of narrative. Ricoeur’s 
further turn of the circle—also known as the hermeneutic circle, or circle of 
understanding—is constituted by the explanation of time within life and within 
mimesis; thus explaining why it is that mimesis + time = narrative, and why it is that 
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narrative is important to human life and the understanding thereof.  
For Ricoeur, narrative is mimetic of human action. There is a healthy 
hermeneutic circle between narrative and life—narrative imitates life and we can learn 
about life from narrative—and the turning of this circle continuously elevates the 
understanding of life. Narratives are exemplary of a model of time, but this is human, or 
phenomenological, time, and not time conceived as a series of points. Just as human 
time is experienced as an anticipation of the future through the memory of the past, so 
narrative consists of a three-stage mimesis, no one stage of which makes sense without 
the operation of the other two. Mimesis1 is prefiguration; the pre-understanding we have 
of what narratives consist of that we bring to a text when reading it. Mimesis2 is 
configuration or emplotment; the ordering of events and the establishing of causal and 
other relations between them. Mimesis3 is refiguration, the act of reading whereby our 
understanding of the world is increased by the new slant on it that the narrative has 
provided. Narratives require readers to complete them; the reader provides Mimesis3, 
without which Mimesis1 and Mimesis2 would be without purpose.  
According to Ricoeur (1984), there are two types of narrative: history and 
fiction. Despite their differences, they have key elements in common: they each show a 
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human truth rather than a referential truth, and they both require the same ‘narrative 
competence’ to be understood. Peoples and nations in the writings of history behave as 
if they were characters in a fiction, just as characters in fiction behave as if they were 
real people, and the past in fiction is depicted as if it were the real past depicted by 
history. Ricoeur seeks to demonstrate, however, that history and fiction not only have 
things in common, but are interwoven in the narrative experience of life. We understand 
history as events that are tragic and historical characters as heroic, for example, and it is 
in this way that history repays our debt to the dead. Conversely, it is because fictional 
accounts are related as if they were historical that we can learn moral lessons from 
them.  
The analysis of the mimetic structures of narrative, of time in narrative, and of 
the relationship between fiction and history is of value in and of itself, and each 
structure casts a new light on the discipline of which the analysis forms a part—literary 
criticism, historiography, etc. But the real purpose of these analyses is to demonstrate 
the narrative dimension of human life itself, which qualifies hermeneutics not only as a 
process of reading texts, but also of reading lives. If hermeneutics is the route to 
understanding narrative, then reading oneself is the key to self-understanding. If literary 
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judgments can be of the ethics within the narrative, then the same may be said of the 
judgments made of a life recounted. 
Objections to this line of thinking are overcome by understanding ‘narrative’ not 
in a naive way, but in the way analyzed earlier by Ricoeur: in the terms of Mimesis1, 
Mimesis2 and Mimesis3. Just as literary narratives require the work of readers 
(Mimesis3) to complete them, so the understanding of real lives requires others to 
interpret them. It is the interpretations of others, and not death, that brings closure to the 
narrative of life. Moreover, our life is entangled with others’ lives. Each of these 
individual lives can be seen as narrative threads within the great plot of our life: 
sometimes the threads are knotted together, sometimes they merely cross.  
Martin Heidegger 
Martin Heidegger is the German existential philosopher who gives the most 
systematic account of our existential predicament. He focuses especially on existential 
anxiety, guilt, and being-towards-death. He also has the most to say about how we can 
become more authentic. We are born into the “they,” into a fully-scripted, well-
organized, on-going social structure. And we will remain absorbed in the “they” for our 
whole lives unless we discover how to become more authentic.  
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Heidegger (1962) claims that tradition has misrepresented and misinterpreted the 
reality of human beings. As a first step in his project, he attempted to work out a fresh 
analysis of what it is to be human. The results are important for anyone that wants to 
understand what sort of being he or she is.  
Our being already situated in a shared-life world makes up what Heidegger calls 
our “facticity.” As tactical beings who are thrown into a world, we are not just active 
decision makers. We are also finite beings whose existence is embedded in a world that 
makes binding demands on us in making us the people we are. We are active beings. 
We find ourselves thrown into a world we neither create nor control, but it is up to each 
of us to take up the task of self-understanding presented us in that world, and shape 
those situations into lives that are our own.  
In Heidegger’s account, authenticity has nothing to do with getting in touch with 
an inner self or with rising above the social world. On the contrary, his version of 
authenticity throws us into the familiar practical world in a more intense and involved 
way.  
According to Heidegger (1962), authentic clear-sightedness brings with it a lucid 
awareness of our inextricable embeddedness in and belongingness to the wider context 
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of a historical community. To be authentic is to realize that our own life stories make 
sense only against the wider stories of our community. When the notion of authentic 
historicity is fully fleshed out, it becomes clear that our lives are indebted to a cultural 
heritage that gives us our ‘basic possibilities’ of self-understanding and self-assessment.  
When we recognize our embeddedness in the wider context of history, we will 
also see that our own futures are implicated in the project or in realizing the common 
goods definitive of what Heidegger calls a people’s ‘destiny.’ To be authentic is to be 
lucidly aware that “our fates have already been guided in advance, in our being-with-
one-another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities.”  
He characterizes authentic existence as virtues or enduring dispositions such as 
commitment, integrity, courage, steadiness, and clearsightedness about what it is to be a 
human. In our actions in the course of our lives, we are bringing to realization certain 
roles and self-interpretations we have taken over as definitive of our identities. 
In Heidegger’s account, human existence involves living between the tensions of 
thrownness and projection. Because there is no substantive human nature that 
determines how we can or ought to live, our essence lies in our existence. We just are 
what we do in bringing our lives to their realization as a whole. 
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Jean-Paul Sartre 
French philosopher and playwright Jean-Paul Sartre (1946) describes our 
existential predicament as meaninglessness. As people of the world, we are busy doing 
things, but we do not usually realize the ultimate futility of our efforts. When we are 
bitten by the meaninglessness bug, however, this can stimulate us to get our lives in 
gear in the creating of our own meanings in a world initially devoid of meaning. We 
create meaning by moving away from “bad faith” and creating our own comprehensive 
projects. Then our everyday activities can be organized toward the fulfillment of 
whatever we choose as our ultimate purposes in life.  
Sartre writes: (1956: 291–300) “Man is nothing else but that which he makes of 
himself…he is the sum of his actions.” If existence really precedes essence, man is 
responsible for what he is. Sartre is concerned with letting the full responsibility of 
man's existence rest upon himself. Because our decisions involve all humanity, we are 
responsible for both ourselves and everyone else. In choosing and creating myself, I am 
creating and choosing mankind. A man who realizes this cannot escape “the feeling of 
his total and complete responsibility” or “anguish”—like an officer whose decisions 
involve the lives of other men. Sartre saw very clearly that the possibility of finding 
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values in a heaven of ideas disappears with the introduction of the nonexistence of God. 
Since existence precedes essence, there is no a priori determinism. Man is free and 
freedom. He is on his own and has no excuses. Sartre states (1948: 27): “Man is 
condemned to be free, condemned because he did not create himself”; But “once thrown 
into the world, he is responsible for everything he does.”  
At every moment, mankind is condemned to invent itself. We choose our way of 
being. Being does not precede choice or action. Nor can we say that the choice of our 
being is the outcome of deliberation. Having rejected the world of ideas or essences, 
Sartre draws the logical conclusion from his position. The choice of our ends is also 
absolutely free. Everyone freely chooses the norms of truth, beauty, and goodness. 
Ordinarily we think of people as being responsible to something—to God, to society, to 
the bar of history, or to an ideal or law. But in Sartre’s view, people are responsible only 
to themselves for what they make of themselves.  
Nevertheless Sartre does not believe that his atheistic existentialism is 
pessimistic. People can be courageous and confident because their destiny is defined by 
themselves. Furthermore, Sartre is not afraid of the charge of subjectivity. He (1948: 
44) revels in it; “There can be no other truth to take off from than this: I think, therefore, 
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I exist.... Outside the Cartesian cogito, all views are probable.” Sartre sees the 
nothingness as the potential of mankind to realize its being. He also recognizes that the 
nothingness is simultaneously mankind’s greatest enemy. 
Soren Kierkegaard 
Soren Kierkegaard is often called the father of existentialism. Before anyone 
else, he exposed the routine ways of life that possessed his contemporaries and which 
still shape the lives of most people. Instead of remaining well-adjusted conformists, we 
can purify our hearts by intentionally willing one thing to happen. 
Kierkegaard (1956) describes in great detail the process of living more 
authentically. He asserts that, though we may never achieve our goals, we are 
responsible for making sure that we live each day clearly focused around our singular 
goal, the good we must try to do. 
According to Kierkegaard, there are two ways in which the good can be 
practiced. He declares (1993: 78): “If a person is to will the good in truth, he must will 
to do everything for the good or will to suffer everything for the good.” Of course, the 
one who acts also runs the risk of suffering, but he is still essentially acting. On the 
other hand, the one who learns to will to suffer everything for the good is one “who 
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suffers essentially” (1993: 100); that is, one so stricken by misfortune that his whole life 
is bound to an unavoidable suffering.  
Kierkegaard exhibits an understanding of and a great deal of sympathy for 
people so unfortunate. Just as freedom’s resolution helps the one who acts to stick to the 
decision for the good, however, so it helps the person who suffers in the hard task of 
freely resolving to accept his severe suffering. Of the person who freely chooses to 
endure his suffering in the right way, Kierkegaard writes: 
Unquestionably he is making a virtue of necessity; that is the secret, that is the 
most descriptive expression for what he is doing—he is making a virtue of 
necessity, he is deriving a category of freedom (virtue) from what is defined as 
necessity. Precisely in this lies the healing through the decision of the eternal, 
that the sufferer freely takes upon himself the enforced suffering. Just as it is a 
relief for the sufferer to open himself in confidence to a friend, so also it is his 
salvation through the decision of the eternal that he opens himself to the eternal 
while the constraint of necessity compresses his heart, so to speak, and he 
complies eternally by willing to suffer everything (Kierkegaard 1993: 119–20). 
Kierkegaard was the first to see the unique character and peculiar significance of 
the strange emotion of dread, which he singled out for special attention. This dread is 
not the same as fear (Kierkegaard 1968: 38). When we are afraid, we can identify the 
object of which we are afraid—be it unemployment, sickness, loss of money, war, etc. 
But this peculiar feeling latent in all men is very different; it has no determinate object. 
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No definite danger threatens, yet it comes from all sides. There is no defense. We 
cannot hide from it. The warmth and friendliness of an environment disappears and a 
strange curtain falls between the self and the world. The color of life grows pale and 
there is nothing to cling to. We find ourselves alone, surrounded by alien things. He 
found this emotion very significant.  
Kierkegaard suggests (1968: 38–39) that this emotion represents being brought 
face to face with “nothing.” As we say when the experience seems to pass, “it was 
nothing.” This is no doubt true. But when we think of it, this nothing is not soothing. It 
is precisely the object of dread. If, as we are inclined to believe, our normal everyday 
existence in the world is healthy and good, then dread is a morbid phenomenon, an 
unfortunate disturbance. But if, as the existentialist sees it, our normal existence is not 
authentic, then is only natural. It is really a fallenness, which we conceal from ourselves 
with soothing anodynes.  
Dread is, therefore, an incipient experience of arousing and awakening. For a 
moment, the veils are torn from our eyes, and we see ourselves as we really are—in a 
drab and ordinary state, not doing what we might be, only half alive and half awake. 
This experience of dread shocks us out of all our normal habits and relations. It 
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awakens us from our thoughtlessness, and arouses us to what we might be. Kierkegaard 
says (1968: 55): “Dread is the possibility of freedom.” He holds that this is the gateway 
to authentic choice and human existence. 
Abraham Maslow 
Abraham Maslow (1971) is an American psychologist best known for 
introducing the concept of “self-actualization.” He suggests that, instead of spending 
our lives trying to satisfy our deficiencies, we can become more self-actualizing by 
creating and pursuing meaningful life-purposes. We are self-actualizing if we pursue 
meanings and values beyond ourselves and our families. We transcend our concerns for 
what other people think and focus instead on being the people we choose to be. 
For the most part, Maslow shares Rogers’s optimistic view of human nature. 
Our innate tendencies are predominantly healthy, and they include the capacity for 
constructive growth, kindness, generosity, and love. Yet Maslow also agrees with 
Erikson that these “instinct–remnants” are very weak, and are easily overwhelmed by 
the far more powerful forces of learning and culture. “The human needs … are weak 
and feeble rather than unequivocal and unmistakable; they whisper rather than shout. 
And the whisper is easily drowned out” (Maslow 1970: 276). 
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Maslow (1968: 29–31) espouses a dualistic theory of motivation. Some of our 
“instinctoid” impulses aim toward the attending to such drives as hunger, thirst, safety, 
and obtaining love and esteem from others. These deficiency motives are possessed by 
everyone, and involve important lacks within us that must be satisfied by the 
appropriate objects or people. In contrast to the deficiency motives, growth motives are 
relatively independent of the environment and are unique to the individual. These needs 
include attention to pleasurable drives, the unselfish and non-possessive giving of love 
to others, and the development of one’s healthy potential. Growth is, in itself, a 
rewarding and exciting process. Examples include the fulfilling of yearnings and 
ambitions, like that of becoming a good doctor; the acquisition of admired skills, like 
playing the violin or doing carpentry; the steady increase of understanding about people, 
the universe, or oneself; the development of creativity in whatever field; or, most 
importantly, simply the ambition to be a good human being. 
Although deficiency motives serve such necessary goals as self-preservation, 
growth motives represent a more pleasurable, higher, and healthier level of functioning. 
Maslow states (1968: 32) “satisfying deficiencies avoids illness; growth satisfactions 
produce positive health… [like the] difference between fending off threat or attack, and 
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positive triumph and achievement.”  
Maslow prefers not to list specific human needs. He writes (1970: 22–26): “our 
motives are so complicated and interrelated, and our behavior is so overdetermined, that 
it is usually impossible to explain personality in terms of separate and distinct drives. 
For example, making love may be due to needs for sex, power, and to reaffirm one's 
masculinity or femininity. A hysterically paralyzed arm may fulfill simultaneous wishes 
for revenge, pity, and attention. Or eating may satisfy the hunger need and offer solace 
for an unrequited love.” Maslow also argues that the various human needs differ 
considerably in their level of importance, with some remaining virtually unnoticed until 
others have, at least to some extent, been satisfied. He therefore favors a general, 
hierarchical model of human motivation. The lowest level of the hierarchy involves 
physiological needs, including hunger, thirst, sex, oxygen, sleep, and elimination. A 
starving person cares very little about writing majestic poetry, buying an impressive-
looking car, finding a sweetheart, or avoiding injury; most anything but the overriding 
goal of obtaining food is going to be ignored. Many physiological needs are 
deficiencies, but not all; among the exceptions are sexual arousal, elimination, and sleep 
(Maslow 1970: 35–38).  
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As the physiological needs are satisfied, the next level in the hierarchy gradually 
emerges as a motivator. These safety needs include an environment that is stable, 
predictable, and free from anxiety and chaos.  
For example, a young child may seek reassurance and protection after being 
frightened by a sudden loud noise or injury; an adult in the grip of safety needs may 
pursue a tenured professorship, amass a substantial savings account, or constantly prefer 
the familiar and routine to the unknown. Although the safety needs help us to avoid 
severe pain and injury, they can become so powerful as to interfere with personality 
development—as when people willingly yield some of their rights during periods of 
rampant crime or war in order to gain a measure of security. “In the choice between 
giving up safety and giving up growth, safety will ordinarily win out” (Maslow 1970: 
39–43).  
Once the physiological and safety needs have been more or less satisfied, the 
belongingness and love needs come to the forefront as motivators. The individual then 
hungers for affectionate relationships with friends, a sweetheart or spouse, and/or 
offspring. 
To Maslow, love consists of feelings of affection and elation, yearnings for the 
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loved one, and often intense sexual arousal. Our hunger to receive such love from others 
is a relatively selfish deficiency need, one that often involves anxious and manipulative 
efforts to win the loved one's affection. Yet this need must be satisfied in order for us to 
develop growth-oriented or “being” love, which is non-possessive, unselfish, and more 
enjoyable than a selfish deficiency need (1970: 43–45).  
Maslow confers considerable importance upon our need for superiority and 
respect. We strive to achieve self-confidence and mastery of the environment, and to 
obtain recognition and appreciation from others. These esteem needs usually act as 
motivators only if the three lower types have been satisfied to some degree. Maslow 
cautions that true self-esteem is based on real competence and significant achievement, 
rather than external fame and unwarranted adulation.  
The highest form of need is self-actualization, which is fulfilled by discovering 
and fulfilling one’s own innate potentials. Maslow writes (1970: 46) “self-actualization 
is idiosyncratic, since every person is different. … The individual [must do] what he, 
individually, is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must 
write, if he is to be ultimately at peace with himself. What a man can be, he must be.”  
The hierarchy of needs is presumed to apply to most people, though the specific 
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form of satisfaction often varies in different cultures. Members of a primitive tribe may 
gain esteem by becoming great hunters, whereas people in a technological society are 
more likely to gratify such needs by advancing to an executive position. Maslow also 
allows for various exceptions. Some people regard esteem as more important than love, 
whereas others accord the highest status to creativity. The higher needs may alternately 
emerge after the lower ones have been severely frustrated, as with the displacement of 
unsatisfied sexual needs onto artistic endeavors. Nevertheless, the easiest way to release 
us from the dominance of our lower and more selfish needs and to promote healthy 
psychological development is by satisfying them (1970: 51–53). 
Summary 
We create our authenticity; it is not delivered to us by higher authorities. As 
human beings, however, we often morally compromise ourselves by escaping our 
responsibility to ourselves. To block off certain avenues of escape and bring about 
fundamental changes in our lives, the philosophers of authenticity use fictional portraits 
and dramatic descriptions of extreme situations that make us realize how, even in 
everyday situations, it is up to us to create our own selves.  
Chapter Three discusses the research process followed in this work. The pilot 
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study is reviewed as both a learning experience and a compass guiding the researcher.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH PROTOCOL 
Introduction 
The research process is carried out within the context of a participatory research 
paradigm based upon critical hermeneutic theory. This research process is drawn from 
Herda (1999). The first section of this chapter presents the conceptual framework for the 
data analysis. Second, the research process is discussed including a description of the 
research site, entrée to the site, participants, and processes of data collection. Next the 
results of the data analysis, specifically the analysis of the texts created from the 
recorded conversations and the researcher’s personal journal, are described. A summary 
of the pilot study is presented, language and translation are discussed, a timeline for 
research is provided and the background of the researcher is described.  
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework used in this study is drawn from critical hermeneutic 
theory. The most significant authors are Martin Heidegger (1962), Paul Ricoeur (1984; 
1988; 1992), and Richard Kearney (1995; 1988; 2002) and Gadamer (1991). Each of 
these will provide a window through which we can look upon the data to gain 
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understanding and will, in turn, be used as the conceptual framework for the data 
analysis. 
Paul Ricoeur 
According to Ricoeur (1984; 1988), the narrative is the basic figuration process 
that produces the human experience of one’s own life and actions and the lives and 
actions of others. Through the action of emplotment, the narrative form constitutes 
human reality into a whole, manifests human values, and bestows meaning on life. 
Emplotment constructs meaning from events by a process similar to the process that 
grammar employs to create concepts from collections of words. To ask of a narrative 
“What really happened?” is to assume that plots are simply representations of 
extralinguistic realities and that they can be investigated empirically by recapturing 
those extralinguistic realities.  
When organizing real past events into meaningful stories, narrative 
configuration is more than a simple personal projection. When the acknowledged task 
of a narrative is to organize and make actual past events meaningful, it is required to 
attend to the accepted reality of those events; nevertheless, narrative meaning derives 
from more than the events alone. It consists also of the significance that these events 
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have for the narrator in relation to a particular theme. Plots are expressions of meaning, 
and the appropriate question to ask of them is what the events have meant to someone. 
Because plot is the logic or syntax of narrative discourse, it is a linguistic expression 
that produces meaning through temporal sequence and progression. Narrative discourse 
is one of the large categories or systems of understanding that we use in our 
negotiations with reality, most particularly in our negotiation with time. Narrative 
constructs meaning out of our time-boundedness and our awareness that human 
existence occurs within the limits of mortality. The emplotment of events into narrative 
form is so much a part of our ordinary experience that we are usually not aware of its 
operation, only of the experience of reality that it produces. We inherently accept that 
certain truths and kinds of knowledge can be understood only sequentially, as in the 
unfolding of a narrative.  
Plotting is an activity in which temporal events are shaped into meaningful units. 
It manifests itself not only in the construction of experience, but also in conversations 
between people and the literary creations that rely on experience, such as myths, fairy 
tales, stories, novels, and histories. As spectators to the recounts of narrative 
experiences—the narrative creations—of others, we understand the stories through the 
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linguistic processes we use in constructing our own narratives. We call this kind of 
understanding—of hearing and understanding the meaning of a story—hermeneutic 
understanding.  
Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative: the stories that we tell and 
hear told, the stories that we dream or imagine, and the stories we would like to tell. All 
these stories are reworked in the story of our own lives, which we narrate to ourselves in 
an episodic, sometimes semiconscious, virtually uninterrupted monologue. We live 
immersed in narrative, recounting and reassessing the meanings of our past actions, 
anticipating the outcomes of our future projects, and situating ourselves at the 
intersection of several stories not yet completed. We explain our actions in terms of 
plots, and often no other form of explanation can produce sensible statements. We can 
translate and recognize the same plot as it appears in various media. Narrative appears 
to be a subset of the general language code that we use to summarize and retransmit 
stories into other words and other languages.  
From the beginning, Ricoeur (1984; 1988) has been fascinated by the power of 
words and symbols and by the creative capacity of human beings to make sense of their 
world. He affirms this response in the face of those forces that inhibit inventive 
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variation. Rather than defer to a reproductive imagination, which simply replicates 
experience, Ricoeur has sought to express the dynamics of a productive imagination in a 
poietic mode of depiction. Such an appeal to literary forms of expression permits him to 
avoid the impasses that occur when strictly rational or logical procedures cannot do the 
human predicament justice.  
In his work on both metaphor and narrative, Ricoeur seeks a poetic/poietic 
understanding that does not operate solely on the level of ideas, for it is intimately 
related to ‘praxis’. He borrows the term from Aristotle; it implies that poetic 
delineations of narrative are self-referential, but have definite practical implications. 
Whatever new appreciations occur from our interaction with literary figures and forms 
can be the basis for changes in our world views and our actions.  
A central aspect of all Ricoeur’s work has been his focus on hermeneutics or 
interpretation theory. Ricoeur’s approach is hermeneutical in that it accepts that we are 
constantly part of a process of interpretation and reinterpretation. We are involved in a 
constant evolution, whereby the past is being integrated into the present, and the present 
is refining its perception of the past and of its own definitions. This hermeneutic 
perspective implies that there is no personal a-historical, objective identity to be 
 
 31
constituted, any more than there is a supreme plot to be deciphered. Ricoeur sets out a 
hermeneutical circle that holds that we are influenced by the reading of narratives as 
much as we influence their subsequent readings. “At the very heart of what we call 
experience, [there is a tension] between the efficacity of the past we undergo and the 
reception of the past that we bring about” (Ricoeur 1988: 220). Ricoeur proposes that 
our identity is basically a composite of all the narratives to which we have been 
exposed.  
At the core of hermeneutics, then, is an awareness that any interpretation takes 
place in a context where one must be open-minded and prepared to revise both self-
understandings and one’s sense of responsibility to the world. It is the task of 
hermeneutics, in turn, to reconstruct the set of operations by which a work lifts itself 
above the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering, to be given by an author to 
readers who receive it and thereby change their actions and world views (Ricoeur 1984: 
53).  
At the same time, we cannot evade our responsibility to the past. As a result, one 
of the most poignant pleas in the whole of Time and Narrative occurs in Vol. I, where 
Ricoeur relates the need for narrative as a mode of self-understanding to a specific debt 
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to the past. This issues from a growing awareness that constructing our present identity 
can involve reclaiming lost heritages, whether personal or collective, that have not been 
allowed their impact on the stage of history. For Ricoeur, the narrative of identity that 
can be construed from this evidence is not just an interesting hobby or a peripheral 
pursuit. It illuminates, within the categories of space and time, records whose 
rehabilitation adds to a more equitable heritage of knowledge.  
Narrative identity, in this reading, is not just a psychological construct, but a 
composite of detailed memories and present re-evaluation. Narrative is both a testament 
to the diversity of human accomplishment and the possible basis for further self-
determination. Narratives of whatever nature furnish the building blocks by which we 
construct a sense of identity. Ricoeur states that the debt is not just to the past, but to 
ourselves; “We tell stories because, in the last analysis, human lives need and merit 
being narrated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save 
the history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for 
vengeance and calls for narrative” (1984: 75). 
The resultant ‘redescription of reality’ was refined by Ricoeur in his three 
volumes on Time and Narrative, where Ricoeur developed the position that the 
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muthos/plot plays the same role in narrative that metaphor does in a semantic frame of 
reference. Metaphor, for Ricoeur, is not simply an instance of semiotic substitution, but 
a vibrant wordplay that encourages new insights into the way the world is perceived and 
recorded. Muthos, as plot, functions in a similar fashion in narrative to the way 
metaphor does with words, to portray the world in novel ways. The narrative 
redescription of activity by ‘emplotment’ is a poietic act of configuration.  
The phrase ‘redescription of reality’, first used describing the effects of 
metaphor, was even more finely articulated in Time and Narrative in the introduction of 
the term ‘mimesis.’ In the past, this term has often been employed to refer to 
reproduction as simply duplication, but Ricoeur introduces the more complex tripartite 
model of mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3.  
‘Mimesis1’ refers to the way in which human action occurs in an unthematized 
or unreflective manner (prefiguration); ‘mimesis2’ refers to the organization of these 
activities in a comprehensible form by means of muthos/plot (configuration); 
‘mimesis3’ refers to the effects of reading or reception, by which a person can change 
his or her ideas and behavior as a result of discovering new dimensions of life 
(refiguration).  
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The construct of narrative identity is another dimension of Ricoeur’s more 
recent work on narrative that has proven particularly insightful. Ricoeur believes a 
narrative form of identity can rescue us from our contemporary dilemmas as defined by 
the postmodern impasse between repetition and indeterminacy. Speaking with specific 
reference to the problem of self and identity, Ricoeur says (1988: 246): “without the 
recourse to narration, the problem of personal identity would in fact be condemned to an 
antimony with no solution. Either we must posit a subject identical with itself through 
the diversity of its different states, or, following Hume and Nietzsche, we must hold that 
this identical subject is nothing more than a substantialist illusion whose elimination 
merely brings to light a pure manifold of cognitions, emotions and volitions.” 
Ricoeur comments that “the most important trait of a project is undoubtedly its 
reference to the future” (1966: 48). The project is a practical determination of a future 
state of affairs which depends on the self. Ricoeur writes: “this ‘possible’ designates the 
capacity for the realization of the project inasmuch as it is within my power; it is the 
correlate of my power over things themselves… It is by virtue of an unjustifiable 
reduction that we decide to equate ‘world’ with the whole of observable facts; I inhabit 
a world in which there is something ‘to be done by me’; the ‘to be done by me’ belongs 
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to the structure which is the ‘world’” (1978: 68).  
For Ricoeur, that humans intend to do certain projects means that the possible 
precedes the actual: “a part of the actual is a voluntary realization of possibilities 
anticipated by a project” (1966: 54). Ricoeur is thus able to refine his understanding of 
ethics: “I will call ethics therefore this movement [parcours] of actualization, this 
odyssey of freedom across the world of works, this proof-texting of the being-able-to-
do-something [pouvoir-faire] in effective actions which bear witness to it. Ethics is this 
movement between naked and blind belief in a primordial ‘I can’, and the real history 
where I attest to this ‘I can’” (1978: 177). 
Existence must be mediated by semantics. It is Ricoeur’s thesis that we only 
come to understand human existence and human possibilities through an analysis of 
symbols and texts which attest to that existence. What aspect of human existence is 
mediated by narratives in particular? Ricoeur believes that narratives are unique in their 
display of existential possibilities, possibilities for human action, and ways of being in 
or orienting oneself to time. Ricoeur sides with Heidegger in the assigning of priority to 
the possible. But contrary to Heidegger, Ricoeur claims that these possibilities are 
projected only by narratives. Only through stories and histories do we gain a catalogue 
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of the humanly possible. The human condition, determined by and preoccupied with 
time, is made more intelligible by narrative. What is time? What is human time? 
Narrative offers a ‘poetic’ solution: intelligibility. Narrative theory thus stands at the 
crossroads of philosophical anthropology, which deals with the meaning of human 
existence, and hermeneutics, which deals with the meaning of texts.  
Instead of viewing imaginative literature as a product of mere fancy, Ricoeur 
insists that fiction not only refers to reality, but actually ‘remake’ it. Ricoeur (1983) 
argues that works of fiction are not less real but more real than the things they represent, 
for works of fiction display a whole world, ‘condensing’ reality and gathering its 
essential traits into a concentrated structure. Fiction can ‘remake’ human reality by 
projecting a possible world which can intersect and transform the world of the reader. 
Ricoeur writes (1983: 185): “Fiction has the power to ‘remake’ reality and, within the 
framework of narrative fiction in particular, to remake real praxis to the extent that the 
text intentionally aims at a horizon of new reality which we may call a world. It is this 
world of the text which intervenes in the world of action in order to give it a new 
configuration or, as we might say, in order to transfigure it.” 
Ricoeur (1981) claims that the task of hermeneutics is to explicate the ‘world’ in 
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front of the text. The world of the text is the reference of fiction, and corresponds to the 
imagination being not a norm-governed tool of productivity, but as a power for 
redescription. The world of the text is the keystone which supports Ricoeur’s 
‘hermeneutical arch’, and it is in the notion of the world of the text that Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics and philosophical anthropology intersect.  
Hermeneutics can be defined no longer as an inquiry into the psychological 
intentions which are hidden beneath the text, but rather as the explication of the being-
in-the-world displayed by the text. Ricoeur states (1981: 112): “what is to be interpreted 
in the text is a proposed world which I could inhabit and in which I could project my 
own most possibilities.” 
The world projected by the work allows one to explore the possibilities of action 
and so have ‘fictive experiences.’ By ‘fictive experience’, Ricoeur understands a virtual 
manner of inhabiting the proposed world. According to Ricoeur, the distinctive 
intentionality of fictional narrative is this offering of a new world, a new way of 
perceiving things or possibilities.  
Whereas the intentionality of history is its inquiry into the real as actual, the 
intentionality of fictional literature is its redescription of the real as possible. Because 
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the world of the text proposes new possibilities for being-in-the-world, it is implicated 
in Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology.  
Humans use the socially-given linguistic domain to understand themselves, 
others, and the world as meaningful. The linguistic domain and the human order of 
meaning are organized according to a hermeneutic rationality and aligned on various 
interactive levels. On this basis, humans make decisions about what they want and what 
they need to do to satisfy these wants. We retrieve stories about our own and the 
community’s pasts, and these provide models of how actions and consequences are 
linked. Using these retrieved models, we plan our strategies and actions and interpret 
the intentions of other actors. Narrative is the discourse structure in which human action 
receives its form and through which it is meaningful. 
Ricoeur (1984) believes that humans possess a competence or pre-understanding 
of the world of action that is similar to their competence to recognize which groups of 
words can produce meaningful sentences. With sentences, this competence draws on a 
recognition of what kind of organization produces an acceptable sentence, what words 
can be linked together in a meaningful manner, and how order affects understanding. 
The recognition and composition of meaningful plots require a corresponding 
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understanding of the kinds of activity that compose human action, the kinds of events 
that can be gathered together into a plot, and the importance of temporal order in 
configuring events into a plot.  
This means that the composition of plots draws on the human competence to 
distinguish the domain of action from the domain of physical movement. The 
competence to know which bodily movements are human actions is called practical 
understanding, and provides the basic unit for composing and understanding narration. 
Narrative assumes practical understanding on the part of both the narrator and 
the listeners, as well as the competence to understand and use such concepts as “agent,” 
“goal,” “means,” “success,” “failure,” and so on. Narrative adds the structure of a plot 
to simple action statements. The rules for narrative composition determine how to order 
action sentences into the total action sequence of a story. Because of the sequential 
linking of sentences into a plot, the agents, their deeds, and their sufferings receive a 
deepened meaning.  
For Ricoeur (1984), human action occurs within cultural settings that maintain 
symbolic narrative forms for use in the articulation of action. These symbolic forms 
have a public character and are not the private understandings of a particular actor. 
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Thus, an act is undertaken with the knowledge of what it will mean to the community in 
which it takes place. The actor in a particular culture realizes that the act of bowing 
before another is a means of expressing contrition within the community and will be 
understood by others in it as such an expression. The communal significance of actions 
confers an initial “readability” on them. The manners, customs, and other social 
agreements also supply an evaluation of actions in terms of their conformity to moral 
norms, and they define which actions are good or bad, better or worse. The tellers of 
tales assume that their audiences understand the appropriate evaluation of the actions in 
a story. According to Ricoeur (1984: 59): “There is no action [in the narrative] which 
does not give rise to approbation or reprobation, to however small a degree, as a 
function of a hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles.”  
Narrative is the form of hermeneutic expression in which human action is 
understood and made meaningful. Action itself is the living narrative expression of a 
personal and social life. The competence to understand a series of episodes as part of 
our story informs our own decisions to engage in actions that move us toward a desired 
ending. The length of storied actions can range from a short adventure to the time 
between our own birth and death, or even to the length of all the generations of 
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humankind. To define a narrative as a linked series of episodes contributing to a single 
adventure with a beginning, a middle, and an end—or as the presentation of a problem 
that is followed by actions that result in a resolution—is to describe in simple terms 
what is already included in our ordinary understanding of action.  
As in his analysis of metaphor, Ricoeur (1984) adopts Aristotle’s definition of 
mimesis: it is not an imitation of nature, but an imitation of an action. This is why 
mimesis is intimately connected with muthos (emplotment), since emplotment orders 
not events, but actions, and conversely characters within narratives would have no 
motive to act were it not for the causal connections that emplotment provides.  
Understanding human action through understanding the intention of action is the 
aim of Ricoeur’s work on narrative. The ultimate goal is to discover the kinds of human 
truth that scientific propositions cannot accommodate. This is a question of how we 
organize our own lives. The point of Ricoeur’s analyses is to demonstrate that “time 
becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative” 
(Ricoeur 1984: 3). We understand our own lives, our own selves and our own places in 
the world by interpreting our lives as if they were narratives. Through the work of 
interpreting our lives, we turn them into narratives, and life understood as narrative 
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constitutes self-understanding.  
Ricoeur (1988: 246) writes, “to answer the question “Who?” is to tell story of a 
life. The story told tells about the action of the “who.” And the identity of this ‘who’ 
therefore itself must be narrative identity.” The refiguration of time and the introduction 
of emplotment offer the promise of a narrative identity. Ricoeur (1988: 246) describes 
narrative identity as “the fragile offshoot issuing from the union of history and fiction.” 
A narrative identity allows the incorporation of disparate events or ideas into a 
meaningful plan. Ricoeur (1992: 140) writes that “the interconnection of events 
constituted by emplotment allows us to integrate with permanence in time what seems 
to be its contrary in the domain of sameness-identity, namely diversity, variability, 
discontinuity, and instability.”  
For Ricoeur, hermeneutics is not only a process of reading texts, but of living 
lives. If hermeneutics is the route to understanding texts, then “reading” oneself is the 
key to understanding oneself.  
Martin Heidegger 
Heidegger’s work is briefly presented in the previous chapter. This is a further 
discussion of his work relevant to this research. Heidegger’s most basic claim is that, as 
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agents, our existence is “being-in-the-world.” This means, first, that we are always 
caught up in familiar contexts of significance in such a way that there is no way to draw 
a sharp distinction between self and non-self. In our lives, we are largely absorbed in 
contexts of equipment that serve as the “dwelling” of our agency. Second, it means that, 
as social beings, we have become acculturated to the shared forms of our culture, with 
the result that we have all come to act, respond, and experience things in very similar 
ways. 
In Heidegger’s terminology, humans are beings who “care” about their lives—
we care about what we are becoming and what we will be. And because we care, we are 
always taking some concrete stand on the possibilities we find in our cultural context. 
Heidegger gives us a picture of human beings as always moving in two different 
directions. On the one hand, we are usually “falling” into everyday, worldly affairs, 
doing what we are meant to do according to the norms and conventions of the social 
world; a way of being that he terms the “They” or “Anyone.” On the other hand, we are 
constantly composing our own autobiographies on what we do and the temporal life-
happenings around us. As self-defining beings, we are always already “ahead of 
ourselves” and “ex-static” in the sense that we are already projecting forward, into the 
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future.  
The authentic life is characterized by resoluteness. Heidegger (1962: 384) states 
that resoluteness pulls us back from “the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer 
themselves as closest to one” and enables us to be clear-sighted about what is demanded 
by the current situation in which we find ourselves. It therefore calls for simplifying our 
lives so that we can identify what the “basic possibilities” are for us, specifically the 
possibilities genuinely worth pursuing. Having identified those possibilities, we then 
make them the focus of our existence. Where the inauthentic life is disjointed, dispersed 
and directionless, an authentic life is focused, coherent, and totally engaged. 
The basic concept behind “Dasein” is being-in-the-world. But being-in-the-
world is, for Heidegger, not merely a matter of being spatially in the world. It is being 
in a situation in which Dasein has the possibility of non-being. Non-being is of the 
essence of Dasein. In death, people see the possibility of not being. However, death is 
not simply the end of life. That would be an unauthentic view of death. An authentic 
attitude toward death recognizes that death qualifies the entirety of human existence. 
Moreover, Heidegger is not primarily concerned with showing the finitude of human 
existence, but that death, as integral to Dasein, constitutes its possibility; for if Dasein is 
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to become something, it must originally not be. Nonbeing, therefore, guarantees the 
freedom of Dasein to determine and to choose itself as possibility, and thus to realize its 
being. Whereas in Kierkegaard it was the presence of pure being or eternity (God) in 
human existence that provided the tension and the possibility of choice and despair, in 
Heidegger this is replaced by death. And death is of the essence of Dasein.  
Dasein has its Being to be, and so in its way of Being, in its concrete forms of 
acting in and relating to its world, it has some understanding of its Being. Such 
understanding of its potentiality to be, of the potentialities of its general form of 
existing, is the primary sense of understanding, since it is involved in anything Dasein 
may do or be. Having such an understanding, it “knows” what it is capable of and what 
its potentiality for Being is. Within our immediate absorption in the world, in 
everydayness, this understanding of one's potentiality for Being does not derive from 
Dasein itself, from the Being of a being which exists as having a relation to its Being.  
In its immediate form of existing, Dasein is simply absorbed in its world, 
understanding its Being unreflectively in terms of what it can do there. It understands 
itself, that is, in terms of its success and failure in living within the purposive relations 
of its world. 
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This unauthentic self-understanding, not drawn from the Being of Dasein itself, 
has an essential temporal structure: Dasein awaits the revelation of itself in what the 
future may bring in terms of success or failure, lives a present absorbed in its world, and 
has behind it a past which, however much it may be a matter of satisfaction, regret or 
indifference, is something finished and determinate.  
Such authentic existing, resoluteness, is the pre-eminent form of human 
temporality. Dasein does not await itself in what the future may bring in the world, but 
always comes towards itself; that is, it takes over what it has been as what must always 
be taken over, so that the future is open, the past a source of possibility and the present 
that within which a new revelation of a possibility of its past can occur. Dasein takes 
over what it has been, its world, so that it exists in relation to the world in a new way, in 
terms of its own potentiality. It takes over the concrete possibilities provided by its 
world, but as possibilities and not as finished modes of being into which Dasein must 
fit. It appropriates its past not as something finished, but as possibility; and this it can 
only do by relating to the past as open and by maintaining it as possibility. The very 
search for authenticity “constitutes its meaning” (1962: 59) and discloses the seeker’s 
authenticity. 
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To be authentic Dasein, therefore, is to grasp that one cannot become authentic 
as an ontic entity among entities or as a static being, but only as the asking and 
searching Becoming; that is, as a transcendent consciousness whose projected 
intentionalities become authentic “only by anticipation” (1962: 310). 
Since its world is a common one, such engagement with the world constitutes 
the renewal of a common heritage or a tradition. A human being is a kind of being 
which, unlike other beings, has a relation to its own Being: it can only relate itself to 
other beings in whatever way it does through having some understanding of itself. Since 
it must always comport itself in this self-referential way, its Being can be nothing, 
which Dasein could be as complete. We can only conceive such a self-referential notion 
of Being, which the being concerned always has to be, as temporality: as a way in 
which what one has been is to be taken over. Inauthentic temporality takes over what 
one has been as simply the past and completed, which shows itself in what one has 
accomplished or failed to do, whilst looking towards one’s future as something 
determinate which will be settled in time by what happens.  
But to understand oneself in this way is not to understand oneself as temporality, 
but as a being within the world like any other. It is the incompatibility between such an 
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understanding of one's Being and the way that Being must always be projected in one’s 
dealings with beings in the world which compels a recognition of one’s Being as 
temporality. To understand one’s Being as temporality is radically to distinguish it from 
the being of intra-worldly beings. It is to realize that one can only be that Being as one’s 
Being in the appropriation of the past without issue. And that can only take place if the 
past is regarded as itself without issue: not as finished and determinate, but as constant 
possibility of being taken over.  
To understand oneself in this way is to engage in one’s past as an ever 
renewable source of possibility, to engage in the constant renewal of one’s heritage. It is 
in this that genuinely new creation lies and which enables man to have a history 
(Heidegger 1985: 279). Man has a history because he is historical: that is, exists as a 
being which must constantly take over its past as possibility. For the most part a human 
being must exist inauthentically, simply living at home in the familiar world. But he 
lives in accordance with his Being, lives it as his Being, in creation, in the bringing forth 
of what is new out of the possibilities made available by his past.  
Human Dasein is different from all other modes of being in that it is constantly 
concerned about its being and its possibilities. So an ontological characteristic of Dasein 
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is care (Sorge). Care defines Dasein as a kind of being which is concerned for its own 
being. The concept of dread in Sören Kierkegaard’s book of the same name laid the way 
for the analysis of care by Heidegger. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger distinguish 
“dread” (Angst) from “fear” (Furcht). Kierkegaard said, ”fear is always fear of 
something definite” (Kierkegaard 1968: 88). Dread, as Kierkegaard explained, is the 
reality of freedom as a potentiality, before this potentiality has materialized, and its 
object is the something which is nothing (1968: 39). What threatens, Heidegger states, 
is to be found nowhere in particular, yet is everywhere. What ‘dread’ dreads is the 
‘being-in-the-world.’ This dread of being-in-the-world arises from the necessity of 
fending for oneself in the world and from the fact that Dasein is a ‘being-toward-death.’ 
Death is part of the being of Dasein. As soon as Dasein comes into being, it is ‘thrown’ 
into this possibility, and this ‘thrownness’ reveals itself in ‘dread.’ Hence man ‘cares’ or 
is concerned for his being.  
In its last condition of being-in-the-world, the being is left falling away from 
itself, toward the publicness of the impersonal world of everyone. In questioning the 
unity of this being, we are still interrogating its spread and its being laid open between a 
past, as always already having been thrown into its condition—that is, its facticity—and 
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a future which is, as yet, only a possibility defining what it might still become, but 
toward which it projects itself; that is its existentiality, even in the present moment of its 
falling. The average condition of a human being as it exists every day is therefore both 
falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting.  
Even as an impersonal subject, which it is not when acting as the self, a human 
being projects itself upon its own potentiality of being, which remains an issue for its 
ultimate ontological concern with both self and world. In the world, it always finds 
itself alongside entities of one sort or another, both with either those of its 
circumspective concern or of its scientific inspection and with other human beings in a 
culture shared by all. Such indeed is the picture of our human condition drawn in the 
preceding sections of the treatise.  
Falling into the publicness of the impersonal world is a fleeing or turning away 
from a truly personal self. How, in such a condition, can a human being come to grips 
with its own personality? Sometimes, fearfully; as when it shrinks away from those 
objects of its world or those of the impersonal world that appear threatening to it. In 
turning away from the threatening object, we find ourselves in a state of fear. But fear is 
still ontical, and derivative from the more primordial ontological condition we are 
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seeking to describe.  
At the same time, falling into a public world is a flight from oneself as a self-
determined entity. What a human being flees from in this falling is its own potential to 
create its own world and its being-in-the-world as self-determined. Thus, unlike in the 
case of fear, which involves fleeing from an entity of our world, this fleeing is in 
anxiety from our own being-in-the-world. Still, its being is disclosed in the feeling 
itself, and along with that disclosure comes the insignificance of the world; that is, in 
our anxiety the world appears without its entities and without the structural-relatedness 
of their significance. It is nothing coming from nowhere within our world that 
determines our anxious state. What we flee in the face of, in anxiety, is thus the bare 
world revealed as the condition of our own potentiality for being in it.  
That our anxiety is conditioned by a state of our being-in-the-world as thrown, 
and that the turning away of our falling into the public world is from ourselves, is 
revealed in the uncanniness of the anxious feeling. Such is the first condition of our 
anxiety. 
The next step parallels the analysis of fear by indicating that about which we are 
anxious. But again, unlike in the case of fear, we are not anxious about any definite 
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threat—like, say, the possibility of being hurt by an approaching car. Here again, 
nothing definite carries the burden of determining the anxiety, since the objects of one’s 
world, the total instrumental complex, are without significance: only our possibility of 
being in a world and the necessity of making a choice for the kind of world we should 
like to call our own can bring us out of the tranquilized temptation offered by the 
familiarity of the impersonal world. Such is the second condition of our personal 
anxiety.  
Falling and anxiety are related as the flight from self reveals what a true self 
must be: a possible being that will not be unless one chooses to accept responsibility for 
becoming that being. According to Heidegger (1962), human beings are anxious before 
their being-in-the-world as thrown and about their being-in-the-world as projected upon 
its own potential for being itself. Anxiety individualizes human responsibility, since it 
reveals a way of being in the world when the nature of that world is yet to be 
determined, and when the ultimate determination of that world must be made by a 
personal choice. No other person can make the choice of how to be for me; nor as a 
moral subject will that self be determined by the things or processes of the natural 
world.  
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Why, then, are there so few authentic personalities in the world? And why is this 
‘distinctive determination of human self-disclosedness’ so rare a phenomenon? To 
answer these questions, there’s a clue to be found in everyday language—another form 
of human disclosedness. We feel ‘at home’ in the familiarity of the public world into 
which we are falling. Anxiety, which we flee in the forfeiture of our fall, is deeply 
disturbing.  
What, then, is the precise relationship between the falling and the anxiety? The 
feeling of uncanniness is merely the obverse condition of feeling at home in the 
tranquilized and familiar world of everyone. Ontologically, Heidegger claims, the not-
being-at-home is more basic than the fallen state, because the reverse is true ontically. 
There seems to be no ontic explanation for the uncanny feeling, and the physiological 
components of the experience of dread seem to depend upon the feeling of the uncanny 
placement of the self before a future possibility.  
The rarity of true anxiety has two explanations. First, the condition remains 
hidden in the ordinary state of fallenness; second, its ordinary ontic manifestations—
other than the physiological—reveal subtle modifications of the caring structure when it 
is one's own self, rather than objects, tools, or other selves, that is the object of the care. 
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Before ourselves and on behalf of ourselves, we can only feel anxiety. Heidegger (1962) 
reminds us that anxiety and other affective conditions are manners of being in the 
world; and equiprimordially with this feeling there is an understanding which was 
previously preontological, but is now ontological: the being of the care structure is now 
defined as a human being’s concern for itself as both thrown-being-in-the-world and 
existing potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Prior to ontological reflection, this 
‘understanding’ is the source for our feeling of this anxiety. Upon reflection, it is easy to 
compare the two conditions of the same self, that of being thrown into one world and 
that of being projected toward another. The original anxiety thus corresponds to our 
own sense of being free to determine our own potentiality.  
As existing, a human being is ahead of itself; but, as being in a world, it finds 
itself alongside other entities—tools and mere things—and in solicitude for others, 
which it does knowingly, since it is always already factually related to some world 
when the ontological question occurs to it. In sum, then, our being human is a 
simultaneous three-way stretch: as projected, ahead of itself; as thrown, already in a 
world; as falling, alongside entities of one sort or another. Since we ordinarily concern 
ourselves with the entities of our worlds rather than with our own precious selves, the 
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basic human state of anxiety remains hidden or buried.  
As open to its world, and in the clearing of its self-projection, the human being 
understands itself as projected upon its possibilities of being. And along with this 
understanding, there is a coterminous affective state that corresponds to a person’s 
finding itself attuned to its world as thrown and itself as abandoned there. 
Understanding and feeling ultimately give the person something to say. 
Discourse is therefore the last of the ‘equiprimordial’ structures of the human being’s 
disclosedness. The difficulty begins to mount when we recall that the human being 
exists above all other activities and, as a general rule, in a fallen condition in which its 
understanding of itself is given through the objects of its concern. That is its world of 
the everyday. 
The human being is brought back to itself, as having been lost in the world of 
the everyday, but now as having felt the uncanniness of living in such a world, and 
facing the anxiety of projecting one’s way out of it. The mode of relating oneself 
authentically to the future is anticipation, and the call of conscience relates the self only 
to the self. But that goes only with the resolute facing up to the anxiety we feel as 
having to assume full responsibility for what we are. It is always a lived possibility of 
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the human being, but it is rarely achieved.  
A human being is above all irresolute; and when it is, its temporality is 
temporalized out of an inauthentic future: it merely awaits itself, as if its caring for the 
world had intercalated a loop between what it was and what it is to become, and it had 
only to appropriate care for the things of its world in order to be a self. For this reason, 
ontological understanding interprets the authentic possibility of being responsible for 
oneself as a condition that is won through a modification of the routinely inauthentic 
future.  
What differentiates the inauthentic from the authentic future, then, is the entity 
that one holds oneself in readiness for: either one’s own most, non-relational, and final 
possibility or the self that, qua impersonal, is everyone’s, that defines itself by the 
objects that surround it, and that always succeeds in repressing its finitude. For the 
inauthentic, impersonal self, the world always gets in the way; such a self can only keep 
awaiting the results of its attending to the objects of its world.  
But this holding oneself ready for a future event is eminently modifiable. One 
way to do this is to expect, to look forward to, but actively, that is, to become attentive 
to the necessity felt in the uncanniness of the everyday world. This kind of expectation, 
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Heidegger (1962) tells us, is a mode of projecting a future based on our holding 
ourselves open to such a possibility that is temporalized as an anticipation. Our caring 
for ‘that for the sake of which’ we care at all is something that gets indefinitely 
postponed, however active we may become in our service to the things or persons 
around us. 
Once the feeling of uncanniness overtakes the lost self, its anxiety brings it back 
to its thrownness. And once the call of conscience relates these two aspects of the 
authentic self, the environing world loses its significance; the feeling comes from 
nothing other than the self in the world. 
The feeling of anxiety brings the self back to its naked uncanny thrownness. 
And along with this authentic past, which has been neither forgotten nor merely 
remembered, one is presented with a choice that may be repeated; in being called to 
assume responsibility for itself, for its own abandonment in the world, its thrownness 
becomes a possibility for repetition. In the process, it is revealed an authentic possibility 
of being oneself. 
The differences between fear and anxiety stem from the differences between 
inauthentic and authentic selves. Fear assails us from without; anxiety gnaws at us from 
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within. Fear is a result of our being irresolute, while anxiety is possible only for the 
resolute self. Fear overwhelms the self; anxiety liberates it from possibilities that mean 
nothing. And although both affective states are grounded in our having-been, fear 
forgets its past and roots us in a lost present, while anxiety calls us out of this being lost 
among the objects of our worlds by projecting the resolute repetition of our own self-
responsibility.  
Hans-Georg Gadamer 
The concept of the fusion of horizons comes from the work of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, in Truth and Method (1991). The fusion of horizons is Gadamer’s idea of 
understanding. Gadamer describes the horizon as:  
… characterizing the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and 
the way one’s range of vision is gradually expanded. A person who has no 
horizon does not see far enough and hence overvalues what is nearest him. On 
the other hand, ‘to have a horizon’ means not being limited to what is nearby but 
being able to see beyond it. A person who has a horizon knows the relative 
significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or 
small (Gadamer 1991: 302). 
We each have a horizon. When we read, we meet the world of the text and its 
horizon, and each of us comes to a new understanding. It is a fusion of what we knew, 
who we are, and what we are becoming.  
 
 59
Language and symbol for Gadamer are the media of human existence. Language 
is not a tool we employ after encountering the world or a mirror we hold up to reflect 
reality. It is not its own sphere of life separated from others, but an integral part of 
human experience. Gadamer writes (1975: 35) “reality does not happen behind the back 
of language...reality happens precisely within language.” Language communication is 
the state of our understanding of the world. Gadamer asserts (1975: 31) “being which 
can be understood is language.” Language is a medium of existence that allows for 
reflection upon itself in which we as creative and interpretive beings are a moment.  
Understanding is the way of knowing in the practical interest, and this way of 
knowing is what comes forward in conversation. Gadamer (1991: 304) writes “the 
individual is never simply an individual because he is always in understanding with 
others.” Through language, we create our social reality.  
Gadamer views understanding as a matter of negotiation between oneself and 
one’s partner in hermeneutical dialogue such that the process of understanding can be 
seen as coming to an “agreement” about the matters at hand. Coming to such an 
agreement means establishing a common framework, or ‘horizon,’ and Gadamer thus 
takes understanding to be a process of the ‘fusion of horizons.’ All understanding 
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involves a process of mediation and dialogue between what is familiar and what is alien, 
a process in which neither remains unaffected.  
Richard Kearney 
Kearney has extended Ricoeur’s work on story, narrative, and imagination. He 
writes: 
This power of mimetic re-creation sustains a connection between fiction and life 
while also acknowledging their differences. Life can be properly understood 
only by being retold mimetically through stories. But the act of mimesis which 
enables us to pass from life to life-story introduces a “gap” between living and 
recounting. Life is lived, as Ricoeur reminds us, while stories are told (Kearney 
2002: 132). 
The role of imagination in the creation of new possible worlds we might inhabit 
introduces the possibility of a new identity through the narrative thus created. Kearney 
explores the role of imagination in the creation of new possible worlds. He writes: 
To account for this phenomenon of ontological novelty Ricoeur’s hermeneutics 
of imagination looks beyond the first-order reference of empirical reality—
which ordinary language discourse normally entails—to a second-order 
reference of possible worlds (Kearney 1998: 149). 
Furthermore, imagination allows for the ethical examination of our past actions 
as well as of the future we anticipate. Kearney summarizes this ethical dimension when 
he writes: 
The ethical potential of narrative imagination may be summarized under three 
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main headings: (1) the testimonial capacity to bear witness to a forgotten past; 
(2) the empathic capacity to identify with those different to us; and (3) the 
critical-utopian capacity to challenge official stories with unofficial or dissenting 
ones which open up alternative ways of being (Kearney 1998: 255). 
Imagination is the key to the possibility of discovering new meanings of our life 
with and for others. The power of imagination is in the realizing of the possibility, 
thereby creating opportunities for action to be taken. The possibility of imagination is 
made available to us through our inherent capacity as human beings to narrate the 
events of our lives.  
Summary 
In this section, the conceptual framework was introduced to provide the basis for 
the data analysis. A brief overview of the theories of Heidegger, Ricoeur, Kearney and 
Gadamer were discussed. The theory of these authors provides the basis for the research 
categories through which data in this study will be analyzed. Next, the research process 
itself is discussed. 
Research Process 
Introduction 
This section describes the research process for this study. Topics that are 
discussed include the research site, entrée, participants, data collection, text creation and 
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data analysis. Each of these topics is presented in accordance with the principles of 
conversation- and narrative-based research described in Herda (1999: 85–138).  
Research Site 
The primary research sites are South Korea and the United States. Participants 
were in San Francisco and Seoul. Both formal and informal research participants were a 
part of this study. Additional conversation partners are included.  
Entrée to Research Participants 
I had ten research participants at the research sites. Most of the participants were 
known to me personally or introduced to me by other professionals. I engaged in 
conversations with five Korean-American participants for the study. They were 
naturalized and educated in the United States. One Korean participant was born and 
educated in South Korea. All conversations were conducted either in English or Korean. 
If a conversation was conducted in Korean, I translated it into English.  
Participants 
Ten formal participants took part in San Francisco and Seoul. Informal 
participants were also a part of this study as they became available. The research 
included participants from the following professions: pastor, professor, profit and non-
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profit executives. Selection of participants was based on the following research 
criterion: they were formally educated, and philosophical. All participants were or had 
been in leadership positions in various settings in South Korea and the United States. A 
list of the participants can be found in Appendix B. The formal participants were 
initially contacted by phone or email. Upon expression of their willingness to 
participate, I sent them a formal invitation letter (Appendix A). The Letter of 
Participation included research questions to help guide and direct the conversation.  
This research abided by the guidelines of the Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the University of San Francisco. My 
application was reviewed and approved by the committee.  
Research Categories and Question 
Three categories were identified for the proposed research: authenticity, 
narrative identity, and imagination. The purpose of the research categories was to 
provide both direction and boundaries for data collection and data analysis.  
Category I: Authenticity 
In his book, Being and Time (1962), Heidegger claims that, in decisive moments 
of resolution, we can envision ways of integrating our newfound existential knowledge 
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into the projects which constitute our lives, thereby appropriating ‘existence’ so as to 
make it our own. Such ‘authenticity’ thus characterizes an existence in which an 
individual’s life projects are brought into harmony with the existential structures which 
condition them, transforming that individual’s guilty and anxious repression of his/her 
essential finitude and groundlessness into a reverence for the possible. It is in such a 
state that individuals can imagine and carry out different actions in their lives.  
Category II: Narrative Identity 
For Ricoeur, life is a narrative. In life, we have what Ricoeur calls a ‘narrative 
identity.’ Despite our being different, in terms of both physical and moral attributes, at 
different times in our lives, we are still the same people. We maintain this sameness of 
personhood by having self-constancy; it is this that constitutes our character. If we 
prove ourselves reliable, we show ourselves to be people of good character despite the 
changes that may happen in our lives. Ricoeur writes (1992: 165): 
Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself 
so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I 
am accountable for my actions before another. The term ‘responsibility’ unites 
both meanings: ‘count on’ and ‘being accountable for’. It unites them, adding to 
them an idea of a response to the question ‘Where are you?’ asked by another 
who needs me. This response is the following: ‘Here I am!’, a response that is a 
statement of self-constancy.  
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Category III: Imagination 
Imagination is not an unethical process of subjection and overdetermination, but 
a process of exploring the multiple dynamics of relation between an ‘I’ and its world, 
the opening of time to more possible outcomes, and all that it means for new modes of 
the self and how to act. Kearney writes (1998: 142) that “imagination can be recognized 
accordingly as the act of responding to a demand for new meaning, the demand of 
emerging realities to be by being said in new ways.” 
The following guide questions provided the framework to initiate the 
conversations with my participants. Questions could move in and between categories. 
Other questions were included in conversation.  
1. What makes for a well-lived life? 
2. What is the story of your life that most dramatically portrays who you are? 
3. Who are the most significant people in your life who have given you ideas of 
what is important for living an authentic life? 
4. What is one aspect of your own story that was highly significant in shaping your 
life today? 
5. How will you become different in the future? 
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6. What do you imagine the future will be for yourself and society?  
The boundaries of this research were created by both the people who agreed to 
participate and the selected categories for data collection and analysis. How the data 
might be understood and used by the reader depends on the tradition of each reader and 
what each reader will bring to this text.  
Data Collection and Text Creation 
Data collection involved literature reviews, entries from a personal journal, 
transcriptions of recorded conversations, an analysis of available documents, and 
personal observation. The entire research process was recorded in a personal journal, 
which became another source of data and took the form of a text to be analyzed through 
the procedures for textual analysis described below. The personal journal was an 
important source of data, since it showed significant changes over time in the 
researcher’s interpretation and knowledge of the process and the theory. Conversations 
were undertaken both on a formal and informal basis. Each of these conversations was 
recorded and transcribed with the permission of the research participant. The 
transcription along with the preliminary analysis were then sent to the participants for 
review and possible revision. Participants had the opportunity to reflect on both the 
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conversation and the preliminary analysis. Once the transcript was approved by the 
conversation partner, it was made a part of the research data for this study. In some 
cases, a follow-up conversation was undertaken in order to more deeply explore issues 
raised during the first conversation or to cover any areas that were missed. Informal 
conversations were a part of this research and followed the established procedures as 
closely as possible. 
Data Analysis 
The analysis of data with the participatory hermeneutic approach to research was 
a creative and imaginative act. I was appropriating the proposed worlds disclosed 
through the texts. As I was exposed to the texts, I changed in such a manner that I saw 
the world differently; hence I became a different person through the research process. I 
followed the sequence for data analysis presented in Herda (1999: 98–99). 
1. Fix the taped conversations through transcription. 
2. Examine the transcripts. 
3. Substantiate the themes with quotes from the transcripts. 
4. Examine the themes in light of the theoretical framework of critical hermeneutic 
categories selected. 
 
 68
5. Send transcriptions to the research participant. 
6. Set a context for the research discussion. 
7. Discuss groupings of themes and sub-themes within each category in light of the 
theory and problem at hand. 
8. Discuss the research problem at a theoretical level. 
9. Search out implications for the written discussion that provide insight and new 
direction for the issue or problem under investigation. 
10. Identify those aspects of the research that merit further study. 
11. Relate the study to myself in terms of what I learned and what role the study 
played in my life. 
Pilot Study 
Introduction 
A pilot study was conducted during the fall of 2006 in order to explore the issues 
that are here being proposed for study. One conversation was undertaken using an 
abbreviated version of the research processes discussed above. These processes were 
utilized in the pilot study, which in turn produced helpful insights for further study and 
aided in the development of appropriate research questions and categories. The 
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description of the pilot study that follows covers the topics of the participant, theory, 
discussion, and implications. 
Participant in Pilot Study 
My research conversation partner for this study was Jin S. Yang, the Korean-
American Republican mayor of Corte Madera, California. Mr. Yang has a long resume 
as both an entrepreneur and a social service worker. In 1999, Yang was elected onto the 
Town Council of Corte Madera. He served as the town’s vice-mayor in November 2001 
and is currently presiding as mayor. In February 2002, he became the Chairman of the 
Twin Cities (Corte Madera, Larkspur) Police Council. 
Theory Used in Pilot Study 
The theory used in this study is the same as that discussed above in the 
“Conceptual Framework” section, with an emphasis on the narrative theory of Ricoeur 
and Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. 
Discussion of the Pilot Study 
The conversation with the participant listed above was helpful and informative 
in the development of the questions and categories for this research. The entire text of 
the data synthesis, text analysis and implications can be found in Appendix E. This pilot 
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study reviewed data from a conversation with Mr. Yang. Taking data from this source 
and subjecting it to analysis through the lens of critical hermeneutical theory has led to 
the following implications. This pilot study was useful in helping me determine if this 
topic was actually what I wanted to pursue for my dissertation. In the end, it was found 
to be of great interest. More specifically, I tested my questions and found that they were 
effective for carrying out our conversation and led the conversation to revealing and 
provoking areas. Originally, I had four categories. After this pilot study, I reduced the 
number of categories to three. I found this more manageable.  
Language and Translation 
The conversation in the pilot study was conducted in Korean and translated into 
English prior to its transcription.  
Timeline 
The pilot study was carried out as described above. The rest of this research was 
completed from June through December of 2007. I anticipate turning the first draft of 
my dissertation in to my chair February 4, 2008, and turning in the final version to the 
rest of my committee members approximately April of 2008.  
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Journal 
The entire research process was recorded in a personal journal which became a 
source of data. A journal excerpt can be found in Appendix F. 
Background of the Researcher 
I am a doctoral student at the University of San Francisco. I received my M.A. 
in Counseling Psychology from the University of San Francisco in 2003, and a B.A. in 
Psychology from the University of Rochester in New York in 1997. I have been a 
marriage and family therapist intern at the Asian Perinatal Advocates of San Francisco 
General Hospital, specializing in the serving of low-income families with children with 
developmental deficiencies. 
I have many needs at this time of my life. I am about to finish my studies and am 
also working hard to promote my own spiritual growth. I have become a father recently. 
Starting a family is certainly among the most exciting and memorable aspects of one’s 
life, but it’s also challenging. Financial commitments become significant at the same 
time as personal responsibilities multiply and reach an entirely new level. I am 
motivated, ready, willing and able to start the new journey of my life and to become the 
person that I am meant to be.  
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Summary 
The above section presented the conversationally-based research protocol. The 
research process was discussed in terms of the research site, entrée, participants, 
research categories, research questions, data collection, text creation, and the means of 
data analysis. This process was based upon the creation of a text and, through the 
analysis of that text, the unfolding of the possibility of being personally affected by it. 
Chapter Four presents the data and analysis. Quotes from the conversations are 
integrated with theory to interpret the results of the analysis. The analysis will lead to 
social and personal implications for action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Today, our will to meaning is frustrated on a worldwide scale. Ever more we 
are haunted by a feeling of meaninglessness which is often accompanied by a feeling of 
emptiness. It mainly manifests itself in boredom and apathy. While boredom is 
indicative of a loss of interest in the world, apathy betrays a lack of the initiative to do 
something in the world, to change something in the world. Our industrialized society is 
out to satisfy all human needs, and its companion, consumer society, is even out to 
create ever new needs to satisfy; but the most human need—the need to find and fulfill a 
meaning in our lives—is frustrated by this society.  
Authenticity 
Authenticity imparts to our lives a commitment to making those lives our own 
by fully owning up to what we do and who we are. Being authentic, we confront the fact 
that our life stories add up to a greater whole. Becoming authentic may not radically 
change the contents of our lives, but authenticity does change how we live.  
Dr. Kim is a 33 years old dentist and the president of Frisco Dental Clinic in 
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Burlingame, California. He stated: 
I don’t really know what I am meant to do. I feel that everybody has some kind 
of destiny or purpose in life, but I am dumbfounded about what I’m supposed to 
do. I ask myself everyday “what am I really here for, but never can come up 
with an answer. I know that in life we’re not supposed to have the answers to 
everything, and we as human beings always seem to ask the questions that are 
hard to be answered… like why am I really here and what is my purpose on 
earth… I guess in time we’ll see, or maybe not. I’d just like to know where I’m 
supposed to be and what exactly I’m supposed to be doing. Maybe I am 
fulfilling my purpose already… not really sure. 
Dr. Kim told me that he often wondered if his life was on the right track. “I 
have many things to do, before I die…but I don’t think I have enough accomplishments 
yet.” During our conversation, he seemed to be under a lot of stress. I later learned that 
Dr. Kim was deeply involved in his career and personal life, but he felt he was just 
striving to achieve social approval and to meet the expectations of others. Although he 
was a responsible adult, he was not clear about what his life purposes were. He stated, 
“I think I do things in order to achieve social approval or to attain the rewards that come 
from having acted properly.”  
Given such a means/ends orientation to life, he tended to live strategically, 
trying to figure out the most cost-effective means to obtaining the ends he desired.  
Mai-Mai Q. Ho, LCSW, is the Executive Director of APA. An immigrant from 
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Hong Kong, she speaks Cantonese, Mandarin and Toishanese. She received her Master 
of Social Work degree from the University of California, Berkeley, and is a licensed 
clinical social worker. She is chair of the Asians Committee, which is part of the San 
Francisco Department of Human Services Family Preservation and Support program; an 
Advisory Council member of the SafeStart Initiation; a Steering Committee member of 
the San Francisco Family Support Network; and a Board member of the California 
Family Resource Association at the state level. For her, a good life is in the services she 
performs for humanity. She said: 
Giving is fun, and more and more people have to recognize that even if you are 
disposed to do it, you don’t have to wait until you die; that the needs are now 
and tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and you ought to be able to plan your 
resource distribution so that you can do it and see what good it does and reap 
the joy and fun of seeing something happen. I don’t believe in doing it when 
you do die. I believe in doing it now.  
Ms. Ho believed that society would be considerably sicker without philanthropy 
and volunteerism. She went on to say, “It would be very sick without the resource 
allocations and very sick without the leadership because you can’t leave it to the 
government. Much of what we do in our society has to be supported by the private 
sector.”  
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She talked about creating a better environment and promoting personal 
responsibility. She said: 
If you are in a position to create a better environment in your lifetime, if you’re 
in a position to do something about the community and you don’t, I think you 
are missing out on a lot of reward that you should get. You’re really not living 
up to the responsibility that you should have as someone who is healthy and 
wealthy, not only in terms of dollars but in terms of time to help the community 
be a better place to live because you were there.... 
Kwan J. Oh is the pastor of the San Francisco Full Gospel Church. He was sent 
there 40 years ago by Pastor David Yonggi Cho of the Yoido Full Gospel Church. He 
came to the United States with his family, five hundred dollars, and a Bible. According 
to him, his purpose in life was to serve Christ. He said: 
Each of us was made for a particular purpose, even if we don’t know what it is. 
When you want to know about purpose and design, it is only natural that you 
have to go to the Designer and to the One who gave you purpose. 
 He went on to say: 
Life should be seen as an eternal process of joyous spiritual discovery and 
growth: in the beginning stages of earthly life, the individual undergoes a 
period of training and education which, if it is successful, gives him or her the 
basic intellectual and spiritual tools necessary for continued growth. When 
individuals attain physical maturity in adulthood, they become responsible for 
their further progress, which now depends entirely on the efforts they 
themselves make. 
He believed that many people live their lives without ever reflecting on life 
itself or its meaning for them. He said: 
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Their lives may be full of activities. They may marry, have children, run a 
business, or become scientists or musicians, without ever obtaining any degree 
of understanding of why they do these things. Their lives have no overall 
purpose to give meaning to separate events, and they may have no clear idea of 
their own nature or identity, of who they really are.  
According to him, we must look at our inner lives. “Our hearts must be right for 
us to bear fruit that is in accordance with God’s ways.” He urged me to take 
responsibility for my own way of life. He also asked me to pray often. He said: 
We readily acknowledge that God alone is to be the rule and measure of our 
prayers. In our prayers we are to look totally unto him and act totally for him, 
and we must pray in this manner and for such ends as are suitable to his glory. 
Jo Sanzgiri has been the Dean of Organizational Programs at the Alliant 
International University since 1993. She has authored and co-authored many articles 
published in academic journals. According to her, life is a web of intertwined souls 
which collide at the most unexpected points. She elaborated on this by saying: 
When you stop fighting the web and go with the natural order of things, 
everything falls into place. The nature of life is harmony, the motivation is 
hypocrisy. We are never fully satisfied, but that is the precise thing which keeps 
us going and traveling through new experiences until we find the one precise 
object which will keep us fulfilled throughout the rest of our lives. We must 
find our passion. Be it in another person, in our job, in an idea, when we find 
passion, we make a difference in this web, for we are no longer just flowing 
with it, but we are making it easier for others to travel. That is the meaning of 
life. To grow and help all others grow through loving what you do and who you 
are, and then eventually who others may be. 
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According to her, the meaning of life is and always will be a mystery. She 
believed that if she just kept living to the fullest and to the best of her ability, she could 
be happy. She added: 
It’s not the destination, but the journey. I think those that search for an actual 
meaning will miss it along the way…but at the end of the journey they’ll see 
the roads they’ve traveled and finally realize it was the journey…the destination 
is reaching a point in your life when you can truly appreciate your journey; and 
everyone else’s. 
Byung J. Yu is the president of Koreana Plaza in Oakland, California. I asked 
him what his purpose in life was. He answered: 
What is my purpose in life? What was I sent here to do? I think I have almost 
found it. My great love for charity…donating, fundraising, finding creative ways 
to help others, using my money for the good of helping others, that’s what I 
want my purpose in life to lead me to. I hope that I am heading in the right 
direction. It sure does feel like it. It has become a way of life for me…to the 
point where I would rather be doing that, than working in an office job. I will 
continue to work towards my purpose in life…and enjoy the ride. 
He told me that he was very poor when he came to the United States 20 years 
ago. His dream was to become a rich man. Byung J. Yu has since become rich and a 
well known entrepreneur in the Korean community of the Bay Area. He told me that his 
dreams changed over time. 
I want to positively impact someone else. I want to do this more. I intend to 
volunteer at the local city hospital this year, as well as support a few of my 
favorite charities. I have made it a goal to find other creative ways of helping 
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others as well. I would like to live in such as way that allows me to do 
something that will benefit someone else every day. We all can use help, 
regardless of our financial status, or how healthy and wealthy we appear. Just to 
experience the concern from another is priceless to any human being. 
Wan Ki. Lee is my father and the auditor at Kwang Hee Fashion Plaza in Seoul, 
Korea. He has always been my mentor and life coach. I asked him what he thought it 
meant to lead an authentic life. He stated: 
For me, being authentic means knowing and trusting yourself, honoring the 
conscious and subconscious minds. Being authentic means listening within to 
hear the truths that lay awaiting our discovery beyond the inner chatter of day-
to-day living. Then once these truths are discovered, to bring them to life by 
living them through conscious action. It is through action not thought that one 
becomes authentic. 
In response to the question of what he thought was an inauthentic life, he 
answered:  
Being inauthentic would be to believe it but not act upon it. Maybe you don’t 
act upon it because you’re afraid or lazy or too busy, putting it off till a more 
convenient time… I think it is never convenient to be authentic. Being authentic 
means trusting deep inner wisdom and acting upon it whether it is pleasant or 
not, whether it’s convenient or not. 
During our conversation, I came to appreciate the importance of looking 
beyond the superficiality of life and finding meaning and purpose in a way that 
resonates as truth in our hearts and souls, as well as in our minds. He believed that being 
authentic did not mean living an ultimate truth. He felt that, “It means living the truth 
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you know and feel within, today. Acting today in a way that reflects this truth. Being 
true to yourself.” He went on to say: 
The meaning of life is to experience the joys and the despairs that life has to 
offer. To live life to the fullest squeezing as much into each day as possible, and 
making a difference each day to someone or something, contributing to the 
universe. To figure out what the true meaning of life is. To find out why we are 
here. To be passionate in everything I pursue.  
Authentic living is often characterized by resoluteness. Heidegger (1962: 384) 
states that resoluteness pulls us back from “the endless multiplicity of possibilities 
which offer themselves as closest to one” and enables us to be clear-sighted about what 
is demanded by the current situation in which we find ourselves. It therefore calls for 
simplifying our lives so that we can identify what the most promising “basic 
possibilities” are for ourselves. Having identified those possibilities, we then make them 
the focus of our existence. I came to understand through this research that where the 
inauthentic life was disjointed, dispersed and directionless, an authentic life was 
focused, coherent, and totally engaged. 
Judith Glass, Ph.D., is a licensed clinical psychologist and a certified trainer, 
educator, and practitioner in psychodrama, sociometry, and group psychotherapy. She 
received her Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the California School of Professional 
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Psychology-San Diego in 1995 and her M.A. in Drama Therapy from New York 
University in 1984. Dr. Glass is the chairperson of the Board of Examiners of 
Psychodrama, Sociometry, and Group Psychotherapy. The Board is in charge of 
certification standards of psychodrama. Dr. Glass talked about addictions, boredom, and 
misery. “As a counselor, I often see people who want to grow spiritually but who are 
using addictions as shortcuts to their goals. Over the years I’ve identified two major 
conditions that persons trapped in addiction claim for staying addicted: boredom and 
misery.”  
Dr. Glass told me that these misguided people used heavy drinking, compulsive 
shopping, internet pornography, shoplifting, eating disorders, and more to alleviate the 
negative emotions that they were experiencing—in order to escape from their boredom 
or pain and achieve what felt like a spiritual high. 
Many people in our society feel the hurts of their past, feel powerless in the 
present, and fear for their future. Many have tried to find spiritual solace and peace but 
it has eluded them. Feeling resentful of their prior suffering and justified in their 
victimized mindset, such people escape the here and now in any way they can. As can 
clearly be seen in the resulting circumstances of these addicts, that permanent meaning 
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and significance has not materialized. 
 Dr. Glass went on to say: 
As a counselor, I verbally acknowledge these two kinds of Secret Keepers’ 
genuine need to live a sincere spiritual life. Every human being has this need 
built deep into their genes, I believe. But I point out the downward spiral of the 
destructive risks and consequences of their choices. I aim to help them see the 
futility of reaching their spiritual goals by using addictive substitutes and 
shortcuts. Instead, I coach them on discovering the rewards of shedding their 
secret-keeping habits and revising their beliefs and attitudes in order to live the 
honest, open, transparent life, a way of living that releases them to be the 
person they were born to be.  
Dr. Glass told me that resolution for bored people was gradually found as they 
learned to deconstruct their distorted views by revising their beliefs and self-talk. For 
miserable people, resolution came in the form of learning to identify the distorted 
thoughts that were linked to hurtful feelings from childhood suffering or injustice, and it 
further solidified when they learned to practice acceptance and forgiveness. According 
to Heidegger (1962), humans are self-constituting and self-composing beings. Our ways 
of being are not determined in advance by any sort of biological process or essential 
characteristic, but are rather something each of us makes in the course of taking over 
public possibilities and making commitments as to what we will be in our actions. 
Using addictive substitutes and shortcuts will not solve anything in our life. We have to 
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understand that we are free to determine our own potential. We need to focus on what 
we can do differently with our lives for ourselves and for others.  
The above quotes and discussions all pertained to authenticity. The following 
section presents data and analysis on narrative identity.  
Narrative Identity 
 According to Ricoeur (1992: 114) narrative identity rests upon “a structure of 
experience capable of integrating the two great classes of narratives: the historical 
narrative and fictional narrative.” Ricoeur (1992: 116) proceeded to define two major 
aspects of the concept of identity as “sameness” and “selfhood.” Differences between 
these two aspects of identity emerge from the temporal nature of their existence. For 
Ricoeur (1992: 116), the problem was that “personal identity revolves around the search 
for a relational invariant capable of giving it the strong signification of permanence in 
time.” Ricoeur further stated: 
The first pole appeared to us to be symbolized by the phenomenon of character, 
by which the person can be identified and re-identified. As for the second pole, 
it appeared to us to be represented by the essentially ethical notion of self-
constancy. Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself 
or herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting 
on me, I am accountable for my actions before another (Ricoeur 1992: 116). 
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Byung J. Yu wanted to create a company in which the skills, intelligence, and 
ideas of each person were valued and utilized. He said: 
To me, employee participation means that everyone must have the opportunity 
to identify and help solve real problems where they work. I want people to 
come to work every day thinking about how they can make things better—and 
knowing that they will have the opportunity to have their ideas heard and 
implemented.  
 He believed that an organization without an identity is also an organization 
without discourse. He articulated: 
In such cases, people within the organization need to re-articulate the 
organization’s narratives and rebuild its images. What is most interesting, most 
vital, and yet still most misunderstood about this process of change is that in 
order for it to be successful, it must transgress existing communicative patterns, 
styles, and formats. I think organization cannot change if it maintains its 
existing communication processes, styles, forms, and procedures.  
Identity is constructed at the intersection of narratives and images. Narratives 
are the internal stories people within organizations tell themselves; images are the 
external accounts of how others perceive the organization. When narratives and images 
clash or no longer support each other, an organization’s identity becomes conflicted and 
problematic. This conflict can have significant implications for organizational 
leadership, strategic vision, employee morale, company ethics, and ultimately the 
survival of the organization. An organization that loses its identity has no motivating 
 
 85
structure and no reason to stay in business. 
Wan Ki. Lee was born February 6th, 1945, in Pyongyang, North Korea. He and 
his family hated the brutal communists, so he came down to the South. He was only five 
years old when the Korean War took place. “I walked and walked day and night.” He 
described the painful blisters that developed on his heels. “I walked from Pyongyang to 
Busan...can you believe it?” He lived in Daegu and then later in Seoul. I asked him who 
the most significant people in his life were. He stated: 
My father was a physical training instructor at the Korean Military Academy. 
After the war, life wasn’t easy. My father and mother worked so hard to support 
me and my younger brother. We were not rich, but we were able to live like a 
middle class.  
He told me that his father never spent money for himself. “He spent money for 
his family only…He was devoted, generous, and very hard-working…I think my father 
was the most significant person in my life.” This brought on thoughts of my own father, 
who retired two years ago. Wan Ki Lee went on to say, “I worked so hard until I retired. 
I didn’t have time to think about what my purpose of life would be. I just wanted to live 
a normal and simple life.”  
He told me that he always wanted to help others. “Son, help others whenever 
you can.” He asked me to take care of myself, my family, my community, my country, 
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and the world. He bade me, “You cannot live yourself. You are in a communal society. 
You need to be attentive to others. That is the way to open up their heart.”  
The ethical way of interacting with others is also the way that preserves our 
own constancy of character, and hence our own narrative identity—it is in keeping our 
word and being reliable for others. In making a promise, we are saying that others can 
count on us, and it is this which makes us accountable.  
Because our personal identities are narrative identities, we can make sense of 
ourselves only in and through our involvement with others. We can change ourselves 
through our own efforts and can reasonably encourage others to change as well.  
I asked Wan Ki Lee how he would like to change in the future. He stated, “I 
want to volunteer for community service. I want to help and support others in needs. I 
want people to remember me as an honest and good man.” 
In this, I realized the need for us to discover our authentic selves. We need to 
attune to our deepest needs and passions and abandon the inauthentic self defined by 
fears and other people’s expectations. I believe that inquiries into what constitutes the 
best life for humans must be grounded in an understanding of what humans are in their 
ordinary lives as agents in a shared-life world. If we can grasp what it is to be human, 
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then we will be able to see more clearly what ‘virtues’ are needed in order to fully 
realize our being. 
According to Ricoeur, the most important feature of his narrative identity is his 
ethical aim. Ricoeur (1992: 172) defines the ethical intention as aiming at the ‘good life’ 
with and for others, in just institutions. Ricoeur’s enquiry, rather, is into the ethics of 
virtue; it is an enquiry into what it means in general to be a good person—what virtues 
one must possess—rather than an enquiry into ‘applied ethics’ or ‘moral philosophy’, 
which attempt to decide whether certain actions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, either in absolute 
terms or in certain situations. The “aiming at” part of the “aiming at the good life” 
formula is also, we should remember, a narrative journey: the good life is a life worthy 
of being recounted. This is the ethical aim of Ricoeur’s own work on narrative. 
Ricoeur’s (1992: 171) aim is to “establish the primacy of ethics over morality.” 
By “morality,” he means the norm, or set of rules, that are established for us to be able 
to live our lives in a moral way. By ethics, he means the aim of living a life that might 
be described as good. So, in privileging ethics over morality, Ricoeur wants to say that 
he is privileging the aim towards living a good life over an examination of rules which 
might be followed in order to be considered good. If we want to live a “good life”, we 
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must have an “ethical intention”, and, as we have seen, this is defined by Ricoeur (1992: 
172) as “aiming at the good life with and for others, in just institutions.” But how will 
we know if a life has been “good”? The answer is: by examining it, which really means, 
by reading it as if it were a story. Ricoeur was much impressed by Socrates’ dictum that 
a life worth living is a life worth recounting. So, once again, there is a direct parallel 
between narrative and life. Life is a narrative: in living, we create the story of our lives.  
So far Ricoeur’s ethics have been highly dependent on narrative, and, more 
particularly, on narrative that is seen as an intermingling of the fictive and the historical. 
On the fictive side of the equation, great privilege has been accorded literary fiction, as 
is demonstrated by Ricoeur’s choice of various early twentieth-century novels to 
demonstrate the working of time in fiction. Ricoeur often talks as if all fiction were 
literary fiction; at the very least, it could be said that he sees literature as the highest 
form of the fictional. In this way, literature—especially the great novel—becomes an 
example, or even a model, of how we might understand our own lives. When Ricoeur 
moves his analysis into questions of continuity of character and keeping one’s word, 
literature further becomes a model of how we might live a good life.  
Ricoeur’s ethics is a version of virtue ethics. It seeks not to scrutinize which 
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particular deeds are good or bad, but rather to consider what constitutes a ‘good life.’ 
For Ricoeur, life is a narrative. In life, we have what Ricoeur calls a ‘narrative identity.’ 
‘Identity’ here is identity in the sense of ipse rather than of idem. In other words, despite 
our being different, in terms of both physical and moral attributes, at different times in 
our lives, we are still the same people. We maintain this sameness of personhood by 
having self-constancy; it is this that constitutes our character. If we prove ourselves 
reliable, we show ourselves to be people of good character despite the changes that may 
happen in our lives  
I believe that freedom comes before necessity in every human action. I, first 
and foremost, desire the realization of my very self, the actualization of a meaningful 
life. To be myself is to make real my potentialities for existence, the possibilities of my 
being. 
We all must face our own mortality over and over again. Dr. Kim recounted the 
loss of his father three years ago. After listening to his story, I came to realize how 
precious life was. He recounted:  
When I lost my father in my life, it made an immediate adjustment in my 
priorities. The day my mother, and my two older sisters, and I had to clean out 
my father’s belongings after he had passed away, I thought about the fights I 
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used to have over things that were not so important. It made me sick to think 
about the way I bickered and argued. Now I wondered how I could have spent 
my time, knowing that a life I love can be gone in an instant. 
Dr. Kim told me that it was a humbling experience to watch his father lying in a 
hospital bed with numerous tubes connected to his body, his life in the hands of the 
doctors and God. “Rich or poor, famous or not, we all bleed the same.” After his 
father’s death, he learned to treat everyone with respect, regardless of what they looked 
like, who they were or what they had. He went on to say: 
I always thought that grief was a simple process. You feel sad for about a year, 
and then you get over it and move on. I’ve since learned that grief is a much 
longer process than that. When my father died, I lost not only him, but also my 
identity, my security, my lifestyle, and my life as it was. My friendships 
changed, as did my family as I knew it. The grief process I went through will 
always be a part of who I am.  
He was not sure whether he would ever be as happy again. I told him that 
happiness was a puzzle of many tiny pieces, forming a greater picture where suffering 
and pain had to exist because they were important parts of the design. I said: 
They give shape to the other parts that are free and have no meaning by 
themselves, unless you learn something with their existence. Accept suffering 
when necessary, but try to be happy whenever you can, for any reason you may 
find. 
According to Richard Kearney, stories are what make our lives worth living. He 
writes (2002: 156) that, “there will always be someone there to say, ‘tell me a story’, 
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and someone there to respond. Were this not we would no longer be fully human.” 
Ms. Ho felt that all her purposes for living were the opportunity to love. She stated: 
It may change form or expression, but love never dies. I feel that once we feel 
love for someone, we always love them—even from a past life. We love forever 
and love is forever, but it changes us as much as we allow ourselves to accept 
how very much we are loved, too.   
She asked me to remember how many times I have protected and helped 
someone. She went on to say:  
Remember the things you gave others, the happiness you provided them... 
remember it all. For now on, try to be always very sensitive and think about all 
the aspects of reality. The other people who are close to you are like parts of 
your own body.  
I realized that what she said was right. My happiness depended on others; even 
though I thought that I could be happy in my own private world while others were 
suffering on the outside.  
According to Ricoeur, in determining to do something, we likewise determine 
ourselves. We find and affirm ourselves in our acts. In Ricoeur’s words: “In the same 
way that a project opens up possibilities in the world, it opens up new possibilities in 
myself and reveals me to myself as a possibility of acting. My power-to-be manifests 
itself in my power-to-do” (1978: 69). The ‘possible’ is thus an essential component in 
self-understanding. What is important to note is the central place which Ricoeur accords 
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to the notion of possibility and its projection in his project of determining and 
understanding human existence.  
Ms. Ho talked about the importance of taking action when she stated: 
If you are in a position to create a better environment in your lifetime, if you’re 
in a position to something about the community and you don’t, I think you are 
missing out on a lot of reward that you should get. You are really not living up 
to the responsibility that you should have as someone who is healthy and 
wealthy, not only in terms of dollars but in terms of time to help the community 
be a better place to live because you were there. 
During conversation with Ms. Ho, I told myself to be wise and open my arms 
with compassion. I would help everyone, forgive my enemies, and always be the one to 
bring wisdom, love and peace. I would like to make everyone happy with my actions 
and will feel happier seeing their smiles than my own. 
Narrative identity is the dialectic concept integrating two concepts of identity, 
the ethical dimension of selfhood and the self-perpetuating dimension of sameness. The 
following section presents data and analysis on imagination.  
Imagination 
Language shapes our world: the way we learn to describe the world influences 
the way we learn to see or experience it. As individuals, we make meaning by 
connecting new experiences to existing understandings. Richard Kearney suggests we 
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open our minds and make meaning by connecting new experiences, such as beliefs, 
culture, knowledge, values, norms, vision, and morale, to existing understandings in 
peer-to-peer, peer-to-text, and text-to-text conversation. Richard Kearney invites us to 
write a new life story and live a new life.  
In our conversation, Ms. Ho talked about her imagining of the future:  
I want to live in a place where happiness exists in everyone’s heart and lasts 
forever, without disappearing like all the ephemeral happy moments of your life 
in a world constantly frightened by terrorism, poverty and indifference to 
human rights. 
She wanted her children to always have hope. “When things get tough, I want my 
children to not be bogged down with anxiety or despair, but to see possibilities ahead.”  
I asked Dr. Grass what she foresaw for herself and higher education in the 
future. She replied: 
Americans are notoriously pragmatic and prone to be preoccupied with 
technique, the technological know-how of problem solving. Since we tend to 
set for ourselves only those problems that can be solved whether in science or 
technology, the difficult, complex, interrelated social problems that are not 
amenable to technological solution fail to get sustained attention.  
She told me that education in America did not prepare students to assume 
responsibility for the plight of the weak and powerless in society. She went on to say: 
It tends to socialize one into unquestioning acceptance of the status quo, partly 
by inattention to the inequities that result from institutional arrangements and 
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the way power is exercised and partly by justifying the existing system in the 
name of the traditional American values of liberty, equality, property, and 
religion. Because these values are interpreted largely in terms of economic 
individualism, they do not function very well as critical standards for the 
evaluation of public policy. Issues such as health care, assistance to single 
mothers, and health and safety in the workplace can be adequately addressed 
only in the context of community.  
Dr. Grass wanted to do more research on complex and interrelated social 
problems. Preparing her students to assume responsibility for the voiceless was her 
main educational goal for the future. She talked about the limits of Cartesian rationality 
and positivistic research. She stated: 
Teachers, administrators, and educational policy makers must make daily moral 
decisions about the ‘right’ thing to do. Positivistic research is of little help to 
such practitioners because it assumes that research exists only to describe and 
help make predictions and, of course, has no value dimensions. It is unequipped 
to evaluate educational purposes or to assess various strategies for improving 
schooling. Educational knowledge obtained through the use of physical science 
methods, then, is not simply unhelpful to practitioners, but potentially very 
misleading because of its attempt to erase the moral dimension of human life. 
When the morality of an educational act is removed as a research consideration, 
the data produced inevitably reproduce the inequity of the status quo, for it has 
no mechanism to question and to visualize what might be a just situation.  
She went on to talk about the rationalistic trap: 
Researchers fall into a rationalistic trap when they fail to grasp the limits of 
Cartesian rationality. In attempting to make sense of the convolutions of 
everyday life in social and educational spheres, they overlook the significance 
of the non-rational and the irrational. The straight road of rationality, the 
superhighways of positivism, miss the cultural and geographic detail of the 
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crooked path. The qualitative domain allows us to walk the crooked path, to 
explore particularity, intuition, emotion, rage, cognition, desire, interpretation, 
experience, positionality, passion, social theory, and knowledge in relationship 
to one another. As researchers bring these features together, they create a whole 
greater than the sum of the separate parts.  
Herda (1999: 22) reminded us, “to authentically address our local and global 
challenges, we must move beyond changing our techniques in research to changing first 
ourselves as researchers.”  
Dr. Glass believed that these researchers/interpreters were actually better 
teachers. She explained, “As I learn to make sense of lived situations and reflect on my 
own beliefs and behaviors, I am better prepared to teach for rigorous levels of 
understanding.”  
Traditional classrooms have students lined up in desks in several rows. When 
the bell rings, students know to be in their seats, attentive, and waiting for the teacher’s 
instructions. The teacher stands up in front of the class, looming over the students. The 
teacher has all the power, controls everything that happens, and is the absolute authority 
in the classroom.  
 Samuel Cuddeback is currently on the Executive Committee of the California 
Association of Independent Schools (CAIS) and the Bay Area Teacher Development 
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Collaborative (BATDC). He is in his eighth year on the Town School for Boys’ Board 
of Trustees. At Drew, he teaches an English class, advises a tenth grade cohort, and 
attends as many games and performances as possible. His wife Meg and he have two 
daughters, Sara and Tali. Sam enjoys writing in his journal and reading and discussing 
books with Drew School parents and guardians, among other things. On the weekends, 
he is training to become the next Lance Armstrong. 
In our conversation, Mr. Cuddeback shared his own opinions and perspectives 
on education:  
To make change, to keep this country strong, to bring peace to the world, the 
voices of the masses must not remain silent. Decisions cannot continue to be 
made by the dominant culture for the good of the people. We believe that the 
only way to achieve a true, free, fair, democracy and a democratic education is 
to stop training the majority of people on this earth into silence, and a minority 
of the elite into power. Education should be learning to voice and not allowing 
yourself to be oppressed.  
He claimed that teachers were no longer seen as demigods at Drew. “Our teacher 
is someone there to learn, just like everyone else. He told me that the classrooms of 
Drew were facilitated by motivating teachers who truly loved and cared for the students. 
“We all work together to learn collaboratively…The teacher is no longer the problem 
solver with all the answers… He is a problem poser who stands by the side of his 
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students and struggles to find the answers by looking at the world and thinking critically 
about everything that is going on in the world.” 
According to Mr. Cuddeback, everyone had a voice and knew the power that 
voice carried. I discovered that education started with dialogue and collective sharing in 
his classroom, growing into a collective experience that led to the collective action 
outside the classroom; learning was no longer restricted to the confines of the classroom 
walls. With his efforts, students were able to get a sense that what they were learning 
was something that was relevant to their lives and to understanding who they were in 
the world. 
Voicing lets students express themselves, but dialogue lets students learn. 
Dialogue helps teachers and students become learning partners; now learning is 
a give and take relationship. Dialogue is a discussion where everything anyone 
has to say is viewed by the entire class as a valid opinion. We learn to risk by 
sharing personal experiences with everyone in the class, building trust, 
tolerance, and solidarity. Students are validated, nurtured, and encouraged to 
participate, especially when they see others participating.  
He went on to say: 
There is no fear of being told your answers or opinions are wrong nor is there 
fear of being scorned by anyone for our opinions. We know that no one will 
laugh at us. Everyone learns that there can be many right opinions on one 
subject and to live in a multicultural society you need to learn to respect every 
individual’s point of view. Students become open-minded and learn to respect 
others for their differences as well as to be proud of themselves, their histories, 
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cultural truths, and experiences.  
Understanding is the way of knowing in the practical interest, and this way of 
knowing is what comes forward in conversation. Gadamer (1991: 304) writes that “the 
individual is never simply an individual because he is always in understanding with 
others.” Through language, we create our social reality.  
  Gadamer (1991) views understanding as a matter of negotiation between 
oneself and one’s partner in the hermeneutical dialogue such that the process of 
understanding can be seen as a matter of coming to an “agreement” about the matter at 
issue. Coming to such an agreement means establishing a common framework or 
‘horizon,’ and Gadamer thus takes understanding to be a process of the ‘fusion of 
horizons.’ All understanding involves a process of mediation and dialogue between 
what is familiar and what is alien in which neither remains unaffected. 
 I realized from these conversations that teachers were not just neutral 
transmitters of knowledge. I could see that teachers’ personal, social, and cultural 
beliefs, values, and backgrounds and their teaching were intimately connected.  
Mr. Cuddeback wanted to be a better teacher, who combined reflection and 
action in the interest of empowering students with skills and knowledge. He stated: 
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I am merely concerned with promoting individual achievement or advancing 
students along career ladders, but I am concerned with empowering students so 
they can read the world critically in order to change it through the power of 
struggle and community. 
 He wanted his students to be responsible global citizens. He elaborated on this 
by stating: 
We know that education managers frequently make decisions based on 
economically rationalized ‘bottom lines’ rather than on the needs of students. 
This is consistent with the ongoing corporatization of schools and is one of the 
educational by-products of ‘globalization.’ These practices are contracting the 
opportunities teachers have with their students towards greater understanding of 
the political and moral structuring of society. As these opportunities contract we 
run the risk of leading students into the world without the ability to situate 
themselves, to identify themselves, as responsible and aware global citizens. 
Mr. Cuddeback told me that he tried to make Drew more rigorously academic 
and more practical in the world. He talked about the importance of knowing his 
students. He pointed out that:  
If teachers don’t know their students, what they know and don’t know, their 
fears and their dreams, their failures and successes, they cannot help them 
construct a compelling and in-depth view of the world and their role in it. 
Without such insight, teachers cannot help students become knowledge workers 
in a knowledge-driven world. Students will find it difficult to make sense of 
existing data while learning to produce their own knowledge. When educators 
know their students, become experts in subject matter, and are adept knowledge 
workers, they are beginning to put together the skills that will help them 
become great teachers who motivate and inspire their students. As such teachers 
engage students with the world, they simultaneously make schools more 
rigorously academic and more practical in the world.  
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In order to help students construct a compelling and in-depth view of the world 
and their role in it, teachers must have genuine conversations with students. A change in 
teachers’ or students’ horizons should be the underlying quest of each conversation. 
Conversation is the key to understanding self and others. As Herda suggested: 
It requires discussion and conversation with others to reach a conclusion 
grounded in action about what things mean and the way things are done. This 
activity involves changing people’s patterns of thought and action, which in 
turn, happens only when an individual has achieved a fusion of horizon (Herda 
1999: 129). 
Herda also noted:  
We cannot understand unless we move from one horizon to another. Our 
horizons are finite, but they are not limited. It is in relationships that we come 
across new worlds, new ways of doing things. It is in relationships that we can 
have a backdrop with which to see who we are, to learn and to change our 
history (Herda 1999: 129). 
According to Mr. Cuddeback, good teachers are able to change students’ beliefs 
and conceptions. He explained: 
Lecturing appears to dominate instruction at the university level as it does at the 
secondary level; students rarely are forced to state, much less to examine, 
defend or justify their beliefs or ideas. Consequently, while they may remember 
what a lecturer has said in order to pass a test, the information they commit to 
short-term memory may not alter their own frameworks for making sense of the 
world, of themselves, and of others. Their deeply rooted beliefs and conceptions 
…remain untouched by the words of text or teacher. 
His goal was to give his students the ability and desire to learn.  
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I don’t want them to dread coming to school every day. I want them to be 
excited and anxious to learn new things. I would hope to accomplish this by 
having them do many creative, hands-on activities with each other and 
eliminating a lot of textbook and busy work. With textbooks, students may get 
some information. But from my past experience, I think what they learn there is 
easily forgotten and often not very well understood.  
He believed that learning was best appreciated if it was seen as a process of 
discovery that generated in people new understandings about themselves and the world 
around them. “Because it is a process of discovery, learning offers all of us an increased 
capacity for self-creation.” 
Dr. Sanzgiri talked about the importance of moral imagination. “Some students 
are oriented to see new possibilities; others do not appear even to be aware of their 
responsibility to explore other possibilities. When a college student begins to see a 
moral connection between herself or himself and public life, it alters the meaning of 
education.” 
Richard Kearney proposes (2002: xii) the possibility of a postmodern 
imagination, capable of preserving the functions of narrative identity and creativity—or 
what he calls the “poetics of the possible”. This includes a response to the postmodern 
dilemma with a reinterpretation of the role of the imagination as a relationship between 
the self and other, a democratization of knowledge and culture, as ethically and 
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poetically attuned to the lost narrative of historical meaning, and as inclusive, 
empathetic, versatile, open minded, and diversive. 
Dr. Sanzgiri told me that the moral imagination might be understood as the 
capacity to empathize with others and to discern creative possibilities for ethical action. 
She went on to explain: 
The moral imagination considers an issue in the light of the whole. The whole 
is not only the complex interrelated functional aspects of society, economic, 
political, social institutions. It is also the traditions, beliefs, values, ideals, and 
hopes of its members, who constitute a community with a stake in the good life 
and a hopeful future. The moral imagination broadens and deepens the context 
of decision making to include the less tangible but most meaningful feelings, 
aspirations, ideals, relationships. It encompasses the core values of personal 
identity, loyalties, obligations, promises, love, trust, and hope. Ethical judgment 
consists in making these values explicit and taking responsibility for judging 
their implications for action.  
The term imagination refers to the generating of new images of the world and 
of new relationships that create a shared reality in which the self acts and builds an 
identity in relation to others. Kearney emphasized the productive power of imagination 
when he discussed Ricoeur’s definition of imagination. He stated: 
Ricoeur thus links the productive power of language and that of imagination. 
For new meanings to come into being they need to be spoken or uttered in the 
form of new verbal images. And this requires that phenomenological account of 
imagination as appearance be supplemented by its hermeneutic account as 
meaning. Imagination can be recognized accordingly as the act of responding to 
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a demand for new meaning, the demand of emerging realities to be by being 
said in new ways (Kearney 1998: 5). 
It is narrative, Kearney posited (1995: 184), that “brings us to the door of 
ethical action but it cannot lead us through.” As agents of our actions, we must be 
willing to walk through the door that imagination offers and make a stand for the just 
and ethical.  
The function of imagination is the capacity to open up new worlds in and 
through the language yielded by text. The creation of new meanings has the 
capacity to transcend the limits of our actual world to capture the past, and to 
project a future of possibility so we can live our lives with purpose and meaning. 
An understanding of the possible worlds opened up through the imagination also 
permits a new understanding of ourselves as being-in-the-world. 
We are living in a postmodern culture where we tend to just drift along with the 
latest fads. After having conversations with the participants, I realized the importance of 
not setting aside my dreams, and not neglecting my imagination. I should never lose 
touch with the power of my own dreams and imagination and my desire to live an 
authentic life.  
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Summary 
Chapter Four presented the data and analysis. Quotations from the 
conversations were integrated with theory to offer a research text. Data were presented 
under the categories of authenticity, narrative identity, and imagination. 
The following chapter will present the findings and implications, followed by 
the reflections of the researcher.  
 
 105
CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, REFLECTION 
Introduction 
 The research process used was conducted in the hermeneutic tradition, holding 
language and ontology as the same. Rather than pursuing tools and technical 
conclusions from the extraction of scientific variables, this tradition pursues a path of 
social inquiry through the language, history, tradition, thought and actions revealed by 
the social text of people living meaningful lives. My role as researcher was that of an 
active participant seeking understanding through conversation. There will be three 
sections in this chapter. The first section is findings. The second section draws 
implications for further research, followed by a brief reflection.  
Findings 
Authenticity and Authentic Life 
1. We must either choose our own lives or have our lives chosen for us by 
the social forces already in operation when we were born. There are no given, 
automatic meanings in human life. We must create whatever goals we will pursue. But 
before we can even consider inventing our own life purposes, we must become well-
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integrated, thoughtful people.  
2. In the inauthentic mode, we get caught up in the business of getting 
along and getting ahead. We, as authentic beings, should not avoid responsibility and 
listen to the crowd, the anonymous “they” who define reality and say how things should 
be done.  
3. Authenticity is not a mode of Being but of Being a human. Without 
Dasein, there can be no authenticity as a mode of Being of human. To be authentic is to 
be a struggling agent trying resolutely to overcome passivity in life. It is the project of 
winning self-possession, of creating and owning one’s self within the situation as 
interpreted by the human agent. Passivity and authenticity are incompatible. 
4. Becoming adults requires years of learning and growing. Each of us grew 
up in a fully-developed human culture, replete with rules, regulations, and assumed life 
meanings. Even if we were not pleased with the enculturation we received, there was no 
way to avoid or to skip that part of human development. We had to become integrated 
conformists before we could consider becoming more autonomous. 
5. We can get lost in the daily routines and chores laid out by the public 
world, sucked into doing what we do without any sense of the wider context of 
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meaning to which our life belongs. We should not drift along with the latest fads, 
striving to achieve social approval and playing multiple roles without imparting any 
integrity or cohesiveness to our existence. Instead, we need to be wholeheartedly 
involved in our own life. We should not flee from our responsibility to own up to our 
own lives.  
6. To live an authentic life, we need to be true to ourselves. I came to 
understand that being authentic means living our truths as a day-to-day practice, not 
holding them as mere intellectual concepts. All truths must be lived, not just believed. 
That is why we are here in a body in time and space. This is what life is truly about. We 
each have an opportunity to practice what we believe.  
7. Courage and cowardice help explain how and why we often fail to live 
up to an ethic we affirm in principle and want to enact. In many respects, acting 
according to moral values involves risks, sacrifices, and uncertainties, which can make 
such an enactment difficult and challenging. Honesty is not something that is risk-free 
or cost-free. The honest people are courageous in the sense that they appreciate such 
conditions, and the liar is, in this respect, a coward. We could conclude from this that 
liars are not really affirming deceit as a good as much as they are fearing the 
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consequences of telling the truth.  
8. The key task in ethics is not a radical challenge to our values but a 
recognition of how much courage it takes to lead a moral life. Ethics, itself, is a 
human potential, the possibility of becoming a person who can live well with others. 
Attention to the human condition in all its facets would be a valuable addition to moral 
education. 
9. We need to understand what becoming ethical involves or requires—not 
simply knowing values, but knowing how values constitute our very being in the 
world, and what it takes to be able to enact our values. We need to pay attention to 
our sense of self and to the existential demands and difficulties of the ethical life. 
10. Authenticity calls for an ongoing life of significant actions. It is actions 
that shape our authenticity.  
Implications for further research and recommendations 
Although most human sciences have modeled themselves on the physical 
sciences—which were developed to study structures of reality outside the realm of 
meaning—several disciplines have come to be concerned with understanding 
configured through narrative forms. These disciplines—history, literature, and particular 
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areas of psychology—can provide models for the investigation of narrative for all of the 
human disciplines.  
A fuller appreciation of the importance of the realm of meaning for 
understanding human beings will require a different kind of training for scholars in the 
human sciences. This training will need to include a study of the structures and relations 
of a linguistically organized reality. It will also require a redefinition of the human 
sciences: instead of understanding themselves as natural sciences, the human sciences 
need to see themselves as multiple sciences. The object of their inquiry, the human 
being, exists in multiple strata of reality, which, although interrelated, are organized in 
different ways. 
The stratum unique to human beings is organized linguistically, and the human 
disciplines need to hone the tools for working with linguistic data much as they have 
done for physical data. The kind of knowledge that can be obtained from the realm of 
meaning with its linguistic structures is different from that obtainable from the material 
and organic realms. This knowledge is developed through hermeneutic techniques, and 
consists of descriptions of meaning. Knowledge of the realm of meaning cannot be 
organized into covering laws, and it does not provide information for the prediction and 
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control of future linguistic events.  
The object of inquiry for the human sciences is the reality of human experience, 
both that present in and that hidden from awareness. Human experience is 
hermeneutically organized according to the figures of linguistic production. A function 
of the human sciences is to read or hear and then interpret the texts of human 
experience. These disciplines do not produce knowledge that leads to the prediction and 
control of human experience; they produce, instead, knowledge that deepens and 
enlarges the understanding of human existence. This kind of knowledge of the texts of 
experience is derived from a whole set of skills, such as an awareness of how texts 
create and carry meaning, how structures and prototypes organize the parts of 
expression into meaningful statements and discourse, and how transformative principles 
relate meaning to different types of discourse. Knowledge of human experience requires 
the use of interpretive or hermeneutic approaches, approaches that resemble the 
techniques and rational procedures used by history and literary theory.  
The design of curriculum must be reconsidered in light of the knowledge we 
have gleaned from the analysis of the value dimension of research. When formulating 
educational policy, we are in essence applying research outcomes to practice. Without 
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the benefits derived from understanding the value-dimension, confusions about 
educational purpose are bound to arise. The inability of many educational leaders to 
discuss the social role of schools or to have a clear view of the conflicts implicit in 
diverse plans for educational reform may be evidence of researchers’ neglect of the 
value dimension. 
I believe that the notion of research adequacy needs to be extended. Scientific 
research is not adequate simply because it is valid and reliable in the positivistic sense. 
Adequacy must take into account moral considerations, purposes, and ethical premises. 
I recommend scholars do more educational research which will succeed to the degree 
that it encourages a public conversation about the ways schools and educational 
agencies contribute to a just and ethical society.  
I believe that the model for research and knowledge-generation should not be 
the idealized and universal logic of scientific research because this is an inappropriate 
model. In social and educational research, knowledge is concerned not with 
generalization, prediction and control, but with interpretation, meaning and 
illumination.  
Hermeneutic/interpretive epistemology focuses on human action and assumes 
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that all human action is meaningful and hence has to be interpreted and understood 
rather than methodically known in a natural science sense. There is a questioning of the 
wholesale application of methods appropriate to the natural sciences since such methods 
cannot elucidate the meanings of human actions. If the concern is with meaning within 
social interactions, then confining research to the observable or empirically ‘given’, as a 
positivist/empiricist epistemology does, is to miss out on the most important dimension 
in social enquiry.  
To explain the social world, we need to understand it, and hence we need to 
understand the meanings that construct and are constructed by interactive human 
behavior. Human action is given meaning by interpretive schemes or frameworks. The 
positivist/empiricist model fails to recognize the capacity of human beings not only to 
experience the world empirically but also to interpret it. 
Interpretation is meaning-giving, a representing of the world through 
significatory systems such as language and culture. This has to assume the prior 
existence of a social order and social interaction which is a ‘given’ background to all 
human actions. We are ‘immersed’ in the historical and cultural contexts of this given 
world. 
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 As researchers engaged in the human action and social practice of research, we 
are also seeking to make sense of what we are researching and we do so through 
interpretive schemes or frameworks. Unlike the situation in the natural sciences, both 
the subject and object (other people) of research have the same characteristic of being 
interpreters or sense-seekers and sense-makers in social research. It follows, therefore, 
that it is impossible to make a strict subject-object separation between the researcher 
and the researched on the grounds that they have radically different characteristics. 
Subjects and objects and people and world are co-constituted and mutually constituting.  
It is important to understand that teachers are not the only educational actors 
who engage in research. If we are serious about Dewey’s notion of a democratic 
community where all parties have a voice in the formulation of policy, then parents and 
community members must be participants in the public conversation about education. 
I do not doubt that, for the foreseeable future, most of the issues currently on 
the social policy agenda will stay there; however I would hope that if more of us come 
to see policy-making as a deeply human enterprise—one we can all take some role in—
then progress towards a more just and reflective society will become possible.  
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Finally, this study suggests the need for further research with participants from 
different regions of the world. It would be valuable to explore how people from 
different societies and cultures view creating and living authentic lives and to see if the 
categories of authenticity, narrative identity, and imagination emerge from their 
conversations. More conversation and reflection about these concepts are necessary to 
aid others, to question their own work and lives, and to develop an interconnected sense 
of being.  
Reflections 
Autonomy, making our own life-choices, ‘doing it my way’, though a part, is 
not the totality of what makes up authenticity, or being one’s own person. I believe that, 
to be any kind of a person, one’s life must have a unity to it, the continuity and 
coherence of which comes from constructing one’s life as a work of art. To me, 
authenticity is focused autonomy. 
I want to be open to the present, future, and past. I want to constantly develop 
new and creative meanings, uncontaminated by the pressures of social life and everyday 
concerns. My life is precious; I can live it only once. I believe that the impulse to live 
authentically can be strengthened by confronting the anxiety I experience in the 
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anticipation of death and the acknowledgment of my own finitude.  
As there is no proof of the impossibility of authenticity, the search for it will 
continue. The strong effect of this search for authenticity is significant in itself, despite 
the ontological or ethical difficulties involved. The search may not authenticate me, but 
it does make me human. The very wish to live genuinely, the very attempt to become 
authentic, expresses a courageous determination not to despair or to yield to the 
powerful processes of leveling, objectification and depersonalization. I believe that to 
be human is to search for one’s true self and to yearn for authentic relations with others. 
While it is hard, almost impossible, to attain public authenticity within the prevailing 
social ethic, with its instrumental personal and economic relations, it is certainly 
feasible to attempt to do so—to take responsibility for our actions and to foster a true 
concern for others.  
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Appendix A: 
Letter of Invitation and Research Questions 
 
University of San Francisco 
Letter of Invitation and Research Questions 
 
Date 
 
Participant’s Name and Title 
Company or Organization 
Address 
 
Dear Mr.  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in an exploration of my dissertation topic.  
 
Your participation in this research is contingent upon your signing a consent form, a 
copy of which you will keep. By signing, you will be granting me permission to audio 
record and transcribe our conversation(s). In this way, our conversation(s) will provide 
data for the analysis of the subject I have described. Once transcribed, I will provide 
you with a copy of our conversation for your review, comments, and editing. You may 
add to or delete any section of the conversation at that time. Once I have received your 
approval of the transcript, I will proceed with the work of analyzing our conversation. 
Your name and affiliation, the data you contribute, and the date of our conversation will 
not be held confidential. 
 
While the conversations and transcripts in this research are collaborative, the writing 
that comes from them will be my product, and may include some of your editing. You 
therefore consent to forgo anonymity under these conditions. You acknowledge that you 
have been given complete and clear information about this research, and it is your 
option to make the decision at the outset about whether to participate or not, and can 
withdraw at any time without any adverse consequences. 
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Below you will find a series of proposed questions. These questions are intended as 
guidelines to direct our conversation(s). I would like to emphasize that I am seeking 
stories that reflect your personal history and experience with the topic at hand. My hope 
is that our conversation will provide an opportunity for us both to reach new 
understandings. 
 
Reflecting upon your experiences, please consider the following questions: 
What makes for a well-lived life? 
What is the story of your life that most dramatically portrays who you are? 
Who are the most significant people in your life that have given you ideas of what is 
important for living authentic life? 
What is the story of your life that shaped your present life? 
How will you become different in the future? 
What is your imagination for yourself and society for the future? 
 
 
Again, thank you for your willingness to meet.  Please call (415-931-5263) or email 
(jl007c@yahoo.co.kr) me if you have further questions.  I look forward to seeing you 
soon. 
 
 
Sincerely Yours, 
 
 
Jong Ho. Lee 
Researcher, Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
Organizational and Leadership 
 
Jl007c@yahoo.co.kr 
Telephone (415) 931-5263, (415) 577-0769 
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Appendix B: 
Research Participants 
Name Title Organization / Affliation 
Kwan J. Oh Pastor San Francisco Full Gospel Church 
Dr. Judith Glass Professor California Institute of Integral Studies
Harry H. Kim CPA Kim & Lee Accounting Company 
Byung J. Yu President Koreana Plaza 
Samuel Cuddeback Headmaster Drew College Preparatory School 
Eung S. Kim President Lions Club 
Wan K. Lee Auditor Kwang Hee Fashion Plaza 
Dr. Sol. Kim President Fresco Dental Clinic 
Dr. Jo Sanzgiri Professor Alliant International University 
Mai-Mai Ho Executive Director Asian Perinatal Advocates 
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Appendix C: 
Letter of Confirmation 
 
Date 
Participants Name and Title 
Company or Organization 
Address 
 
Dear Mr.: 
 
Thank you very much for allowing me the opportunity to have a conversation with you.  
I look forward to meeting with you, and to our conversation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sincerely Yours, 
 
 
 
Jong Ho. Lee 
Researcher, Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
Organizational and Leadership 
 
Jl007c@yahoo.co.kr 
Telephone (415) 931-5263, (415) 577-0769 
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Appendix D: 
Thank you and Follow-Up Letter. 
 
Date 
Participants Name and Title 
Company or Organization 
Address 
 
Dear Mr.: 
 
Thank you for taking time to meet with me on ---------------.  I appreciate your 
willingness to participate in my research project.  I believe our conversation will be 
valuable part of my dissertation. 
 
I have attached a copy of transcribed conversation.  This transcript once reviewed and 
approved by you, will provide the basis for data analysis. 
 
Please take some to review the attached transcript and add changes or clarifying 
comments you believe are appropriate.  I will contact you in two weeks time to discuss 
any changes you have made. 
 
Again, I thank you for your participation. 
 
Sincerely Yours, 
 
 
Jong Ho. Lee 
Researcher, Doctoral Student 
University of San Francisco 
Organizational and Leadership 
 
Jl007c@yahoo.co.kr 
Telephone (415) 931-5263, (415) 577-0769 
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Appendix E: 
Journal Excerpt. 
Oct. 15. 2007 
What is good life? I don’t really have an answer, but I think good life can be 
determined by the individual in terms of his own satisfaction. The meaning of my life is 
given by my own limits: selecting certain activities of the ones which my capacities 
make available to me, and what is to count as my satisfactory performance. Happiness 
is the unhindered pursuit of such activities and relations within these self-set limits. 
But how am I to understand the setting of these limits? They mark what contents 
me, and not momentarily, but, in so far as happiness is the end for my life as such, in a 
stable and abiding way. What is at issue is a satisfaction of myself, one which, 
therefore, is adequate to cope with my life as a whole. I can achieve some stable plan of 
this kind only if I exercise my capacities with an eye to settling on limits, and on ones 
which I can be reasonably confident that I shall find lastingly satisfying. 
Having determined these, my future is to be a continuation of my past, since it is 
to be organized in the light of what that has led me to believe will prove satisfying for 
my life. Of course, I may change my mind about this, but I shall do so, in so far as I 
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look to happiness as the end, in terms of arriving at some overall conception of what 
satisfies me through which I can then live my life.  
Happiness as the end for my life as such involves a certain conception of the 
problem of my existence: it is one of discovering through my experience a general 
conception of what will prove of lasting satisfaction which I can then use in order to 
plan and relate to my future. 
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Appendix F: 
Consent to Be a Research Participant 
 
 
University of San Francisco 
Consent to Be a Research Participant 
 
 
Purpose and Background 
Mr. Jong Ho. Lee, doctoral student at the University of San Francisco has asked 
me to be a participant in his research exploring issues of living authentic lives and 
finding meaning in the midst of everydayness. 
 
Procedure 
I agree to be a participant in this study.  I am aware voluntarily conversations 
between myself and this researcher will occur.  These conversations will reflect my 
insights and opinions about my experience in life.  I agree that Jong Ho. Lee may 
record our conversation on audio tape, which will be transcribed.  A copy of the 
transcript will be returned to me for review, editing, and approval before it is subjected 
to analysis.  I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time, that I may 
discontinue the conversation at any point, and request any changes or deletions.  My 
participation in this research project is voluntary, and any data I contribute to this study 
will not be confidential.  I agree that all data collected during the research process and 
my name be used in the dissertation and subsequent publications. 
 
Risks and discomforts 
I am free to decline to answer any questions or stop the conversation at any 
point.  I may also withdraw my participation at any time.  I understand that I may 
request to remove my entire transcript from the study.  I also understand that I may 
identified and quoted in the dissertation and subsequent publications. 
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Benefits 
I will receive no monetary compensation for my participation.  The anticipated 
benefit of this conversation to me is the opportunity for personal reflection about the 
issues at hand. 
 
Alternatives 
I am free to elect not to participate in this study. 
 
Cost 
There will be no cost to me in taking part in this study. 
 
Questions 
If I have any question or comments about the study, I may contact Mr. Jong Ho. 
Lee at 1770 O’Farrell Street, #13, San Francisco, CA, 94115, USA, (tel.) 415- 577-
0769, 415-931-5263 or (email) jl007c@yahoo.co.kr.  It may also contact his advisor 
Dr. Ellen A. Herda, at the University of San Francisco, (tel.) 415-422-2075.  Should I 
not wish to address comments to wither of them, I may contact the office of institutional 
Review Board of Protection of Human Subjects Monday through Friday between 8:00 
AM and 5:00 PM pacific Standard Time by calling (tel.) 415-422-6091, or by writing to 
the ORBPHS, Department of Psychology, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton 
Street, San Francisco, CA, 94117, USA. 
 
Consent to Participate in Research 
Your participation in this research is contingent upon your signing a consent 
form, a copy of which you will keep. By signing, you will be granting me permission to 
audio record and transcribe our conversation(s). In this way, our conversation(s) will 
provide data for the analysis of the subject I have described. Once transcribed, I will 
provide you with a copy of our conversation for your review, comments, and editing. 
You may add to or delete any section of the conversation at that time. Once I have 
received your approval of the transcript, I will proceed with the work of analyzing our 
conversation. Your name and affiliation, the data you contribute, and the date of our 
conversation will not be held confidential. 
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While the conversations and transcripts in this research are collaborative, the 
writing that comes from them will be my product, and may include some of your 
editing. You therefore consent to forgo anonymity under these conditions. You 
acknowledge that you have been given complete and clear information about this 
research, and it is your option to make the decision at the outset about whether to 
participate or not, and can withdraw at any time without any adverse consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Participant’s Signature                                        Date 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Researcher’s Signature                                        Date 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Researcher’s Name (Print)                                     Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
